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Introduction
This case study examines to what extent Bolivia has been able to achieve pro-poor growth, 
what the mechanisms of achieving (or failing to achieve) pro-poor growth have been, and 
what options are available to ensure higher rates of pro-poor growth. The analysis focuses on 
the period from 1989 to 2003, which spans a time of relatively high growth in the 1990s, and 
low growth with social and political turmoil in the past few years.  In contrast, there have 
been notable and sustained improvements in social indicators which continued to improve 
despite the economic slowdown.
Bolivia, a landlocked country with poorly developed infrastructure and a very uneven 
population distribution, has had a legacy of high economic and social inequality with a strong 
ethnic dimension. The political system has always been dominated by an urban-based elite 
and has only recently opened to serious indigenous representation. After a disastrous bout of 
hyperinflation, Bolivia embarked on a path of structural reforms in the late 1980s, which 
brought stability and fairly high growth throughout most of the 1990s. Growth decelerated 
since as a result of external shocks, which reversed some of the gains made in the previous 
decade.  A large share of the population is dependent on subsistence agriculture and informal 
activities (some illegal including the production of coca leaves), with a small modern 
agricultural sector, a small formal sector, and a capital-intensive natural resource sector, 
which generates a large share of export earnings.   
Poverty Trends, Profiles, and Pro-Poor Growth
As there are no national poverty data before 1997, we have created a new time series of 
poverty data from 1989 to 2003 by linking information from urban household surveys with 
nationally representative Demographic and Health Surveys. The new time series, which is 
robust to different sensitivity analyses, indicates large differentials in poverty between urban 
and rural areas.  In addition, poverty rates in urban areas responded rapidly to economic 
opportunities (and the recent slowdown), while poverty in rural areas followed its own 
dynamic.  The extent of poverty reduction in rural areas was moderate, did not affect the 
headcount ratio much and is partly sensitive to the assumption made in the data matching 
exercise.  Using the Ravallion-Chen measure of pro-poor growth, we find that growth was 
pro-poor but relatively low throughout the 1990s, but became sharply anti-poor in urban areas 
since then.  In rural areas, growth was slower, but generally more pro-poor. Due to the recent 
slowdown, pro-poor growth over the entire 1989-2002 period was too slow to lead to 
significant poverty reduction.  A decomposition of poverty reduction shows that about 2/3 of 
poverty reduction was due to income growth with the remaining share being allocated to a 
redistribution component which, however, also includes the effect of favorable price shifts for 
the goods consumed by the poor.  
A poverty profile shows considerable regional inequality, with the central highland and valley 
provinces being affected by much higher poverty, compared to the outlying valley and 
lowland provinces.  The most important correlates of poverty are, apart from the urban/rural 
divide, ethnic background and education. There is comparatively little gender bias in 
education (but serious gender gaps persist elsewhere in the formal economy and in the home). 
We link the record of pro-poor growth to the sectoral composition of growth and find that 
urban incomes were closely tied to macroeconomic developments, while rural incomes were 
more dependent on weather conditions and the coca economy.  Consistent with the poverty 
profile, we also find that Bolivia is a highly segmented society with relatively sharp 
segmentations along a formal-informal divide, a rural-urban divide, and an ethnic divide.  The 
formal-informal divide is related, among other things, to tight labor market regulation in the 
iurban formal market, poor credit access for informal producers and other barriers to 
formalization, relatively little opportunities for migrant workers to gain entry into the formal 
economy, and the small inherent size of the formal sector.  The urban-rural and the ethnic 
divide are closely related and are partly a legacy of strong discrimination against the 
indigenous population, little success in modernizing highland agriculture, and little success in 
generating an income base in rural areas of the highlands and central valleys beyond the coca 
economy. 
Initial Conditions, Policies, and Pro-poor Growth    
Initial conditions were unfavorable for linking the poor to the growth process.  Among them 
are an uneven population distribution, high initial inequalities (of land, other assets, human 
capital, and incomes), and comparative advantages in highly capital-intensive agricultural and 
resource extraction activities.  Moreover, poor governance and the divisive and strife-torn 
political economy of Bolivia have made stable economic policy-making difficult. 
 Bolivia’s macro policies were narrowly focused on stability, liberalization, and growth with 
little direct concern for distributional issues.  Such a policy stance was feasible as long as the 
policy environment produced stable growth and some poverty reduction. In the current 
slowdown, which is largely caused by events beyond Bolivia’s control but amplified by its 
liberalized economy, the legitimacy of this economic model has been seriously questioned. 
 The tax system is not progressive and the expenditure system generally reaches the poor but 
is not particularly well targeted. Despite this, a rapid expansion of social sector spending 
beginning in the mid-1990s, aided by funds freed from the HIPC II debt reduction initiative, 
has contributed to rapid improvements in health and education indicators (from a relatively 
low level).  Unfortunately, the sustainability of this expansion is highly doubtful given the 
economic slowdown, the associated decline in tax revenues, and the emergence of huge 
budget deficits.  Buying support for economic reforms through an expansion in social sector 
spending does not seem to be feasible anymore.  
Using a dynamic CGE model we then assess the impact of shocks and policies on pro-poor 
growth, both to account for the developments of the past and to investigate policy options for 
the future.  In an optimistic baseline scenario, Bolivia could achieve a sustainable 4.7% rate of 
growth per year with moderate poverty reduction, but a widening urban-rural gap.  External 
shocks such as terms-of-trade shocks, El Niño, and declining capital inflows all served to 
lower economic growth in the latter half of the 1990s and contributed to rising poverty. 
Given Bolivia’s high degree of dollarization and its dependence on foreign capital, exchange 
rate and monetary policies can do little to cushion the blow from external shocks.  
As far as forward-looking policies are concerned, expansion of natural gas exports will boost 
growth and reduce urban poverty somewhat, but will lead to rising inequality and rising rural 
poverty. Labor market and tax reforms have the potential to increase growth and urban 
poverty reduction, with relatively little impact on rural poverty.  The combination of gas 
exports and labor market and tax reforms would yield the highest outcome in terms of 
economic growth.  If they were combined with transfer programs targeted at the rural poor, 
they would also lead to significant poverty reduction there.  Other targeted interventions in 
favor of the poor such as improvements in credit access, agricultural technologies, and rural 
infrastructure have only a small impact on poverty reduction in the medium term, although the 
impacts are likely to be larger over a longer time horizon.  
Institutions and Pro-Poor Growth
Bolivia’s institutional environment is difficult and has recently deteriorated considerably 
given the political uncertainty and social instability.   Bolivia scores particularly low on 
political stability and government effectiveness which is largely due to high perceived levels 
iiof corruption and low judicial reliability.  Lack of transparency and voice in the public sector 
appears to be the main factor responsible for the high levels of corruption.  Well-intentioned 
decentralization aimed to bring the government closer to the people and involve the poor have 
not (yet?) had the desired outcome due to difficulties in implementation, the loss of fiscal 
control, and the inability to manage the high expectations of the population.  Bolivia’s PRSP 
process, once hailed as a model and enshrined in a permanent National Dialogue Law, is now 
largely seen as a failure.   The goals were too ambitious, there was a serious disconnect 
between the consultation and the write-up of the strategy, it was too focused on determining 
how to allocate HIPC resources, there was no thorough discussion of economic policy-
making, there was too little emphasis on strengthening the productive capacities of the poor, 
and by now nobody seems to own this document. As a result, revisions of the PRSP and the 
associated National Dialogue have stalled.  It thus appears that the pay-off to the ambitious 
decentralization   and PRPS  processes  has  been  quite  low  in  Bolivia  and might  have 
contributed to some of the polarized political debates that currently undermine Bolivia’s 
political and social stability.  
Trade Offs between Growth and Poverty Reduction
Using the CGE model, we investigate trade-offs and win-win situations for growth and 
poverty reduction.  Among the win-win scenarios would be a reform of urban labor markets 
and a tax reform, although the urban poor would benefit more than their rural counterparts. 
But both policies might face stiff opposition from interest groups and thus are not easily 
implemented.  
The expansion of the natural gas sector appears to cause a trade-off between growth and rural 
poverty reduction.  It raises the growth rate but leads to sharply increasing inequality so that 
nationwide poverty would fall only moderately, while rural poverty would actually go up. 
Only if the receipts of gas were channeled as transfer or investment programs into rural areas, 
could this trade-off be mitigated.  The largest effect for pro-poor growth could be achieved if 
the gas exports, tax and labor market reform were combined with transfer programs that are 
better targeted to the rural poor than currently.  
More fundamentally, the model-based assessments suggest that incremental reforms will have 
a limited impact on putting Bolivia on a sustainable pro-poor growth trajectory.  In particular, 
it highlights the fundamental constraint imposed by the very low domestic savings rate, which 
limits growth, increases vulnerability to external events, and limits opportunities for pro-poor 
policy-making.  In addition, the high dualism of the economy is sharply reducing the poverty 
impact of growth.   It thus appears to be necessary to confront some of the deep-seated 
inequalities in opportunities, resources, and power.  
Recommendations for Policy-Making
We find that there is a range of incremental policies that could lift growth and poverty 
reduction in urban areas, where, in the absence of shocks, poverty reduction is expected to 
continue in coming years.  Among them are policies to develop the gas sector, deregulation of 
urban labor markets, and income tax reform.  The options to reduce rural poverty are much 
more limited.  Our model-based estimates suggest that transfer programs (such as a demand-
side transfer program linked to human capital investments) might be the best option, although 
a   combination   of   investments   in   rural   infrastructure,   micro-credit,   and   agricultural 
productivity might also be of some help.  A combination of such transfer and investment 
programs with gas exports, tax and labor market reforms might be a politically and 
economically feasible option.  
In addition, there are clear opportunities for improvements in policy-making at the macro and 
fiscal level.  At the macro level, it is critical to develop policies that raise the domestic savings 
iiirate. They could include institutional reforms to widen the coverage of savings, greater public 
savings (e.g. from the proceeds of gas exports) and, at the international level, further debt 
relief.  In addition, it is necessary to implement, to the extent feasible, policies to reduce 
dollarization of the economy in order to increase the room to maneuver for an active monetary 
and exchange rate policy that could support growth and poverty reduction. 
Similarly, there are opportunities to increase the progressivity of the tax system and improve 
the poverty impact of public spending.  In addition, policies to strengthen the productive 
capacities of the poor (such as the  Cadenas Productivas  Initiative and other pro-active 
policies) should receive the same attention as the expansion of social sector spending has.  
Apart from these incremental reforms, it appears urgently necessary to confront some of the 
deep-seated inequalities in assets, opportunities, resources, and power in Bolivia.  Among the 
policies to consider are revisiting the stalled land reform program, policies to transfer 
proceeds from natural gas directly to the poor, and policies to increase the voice of Bolivia’s 
marginalized indigenous communities.   
ivChapter 1: Historical Context 
Bolivia is a large land-locked country with low population density (8 people per km2), 
difficult   terrain,   and   consequently   poorly   developed   transport   and   communications 
infrastructure (see Table 1). It is characterized by great economic and social inequalities with 
deep historical roots. Apart from a Spanish-speaking population (consisting of people of 
Spanish and mixed descent) that has dominated political and social affairs since independence 
in the early 19
th century, Bolivia also has a very large indigenous population that comprises 
Aymara-speaking people in the highlands, Quechua-speaking people in the valleys, and 
smaller ethnic groups in the lowlands and the rainforest. Consequently, Bolivia is one of the 
most ethnically diverse countries in Latin America. Its index of ethnic fractionalization in 
1998 stood at 0.74, compared to an average for Latin America and the Caribbean of 0.42 
(Alesina et al. 2003).
1 
Until   the   revolutionary   government   of   Victor  Paz   Estenzoro  installed   in  1952,  most 
indigenous people lived in serf-like arrangements in rural areas. The agrarian reform in 1953 
freed the peasants in the highlands and gave them access to land. Since then, subdivisions of 
land and population pressure have created smaller and smaller land-holdings (minifundismo) 
and landlessness has recently become a problem. In other parts of the country, particularly the 
lowlands, large estates dedicated to commercial farming predominate. As a result, the Gini 
coefficient   for   land   inequality   stood   at   0.768   in   1989,   indicating   overall   high   land 
concentration similar to other Latin American countries (Deininger and Squire 1998). The 
other main source of incomes in the highlands, tin and silver mining, became progressively 
less lucrative and was sharply curtailed in the 1980s. Also here, the indigenous people had 
been used as forced labor for many centuries and as free miners since the 1950s, who 
organized themselves in unions. The mines became the breeding ground for considerable 
labor unrest throughout much of the 1970s and 1980s.
In contrast, the previously largely unpopulated lowlands surrounding Santa Cruz have become 
the focus of settlement and growth in recent decades, fuelled by a large-scale farming sector 
as well as the discovery of natural resources (oil and gas). 
Starting in the 1970s, Bolivia became a major exporter of coca leaves, the input to cocaine, 
which became Bolivia’s most lucrative cash crop. The coca growing regions (Chapare and 
Yungas) became the focus of much in-migration (temporary and permanent) from other rural 
areas, generating considerable remittances. At the same time, under pressure from the United 
States, Bolivian governments promised coca eradication and pursued it with varying degrees 
of intensity. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, coca eradication was pursued much more 
vigorously, leading to a decline in production of some 80% (World Bank 2004b). The ebb and 
flow of these eradication efforts have played a significant role in the income sources of poor 
rural households.
1   The index measures the likelihood that two randomly drawn people from the population belong to 
different ethnic groups.Table 1: Bolivia in a Comparative Latin American Perspective, 2001
Bolivia Argentina Brazil Chile Ecuador Guatemala Paraguay Peru
Economic Indicators
GNI per capita (PPP $) 2240.00 10980.00 7070.00 8840.00 2960.00 4380.00 5180.00 4470.00
Average GDP Growth 1994–2001 (%) 3.46 1.48 2.86 5.14 1.64 3.85 1.76 4.30
Average Population Growth 1994–2001 (%) 2.30 1.26 1.30 1.34 1.95 2.63 2.55 1.69
Population density (people per km2)  7.85 13.70 20.39 20.57 46.52 107.75 14.18 20.58
Average Inflation 1999–2001 2.79 -1.06 6.25 3.58 62.00 6.16 7.67 3.07
Average GDP Shares 1999–2001  of 
   Agriculture 15.27 4.84 7.99 8.57 10.98 22.83 20.85 8.58
   Industry 28.92 27.36 29.88 34.53 36.86 19.82 26.08 29.90
   Services 55.81 67.80 62.13 56.90 52.16 57.35 53.07 61.51
   Exports 17.66 10.70 11.58 30.44 36.89 19.30 22.42 15.53
   Current Account Deficit -4.97 -3.01 -4.52 -1.24 3.01 -5.72 -2.92 -2.61
   Budget Deficit -4.14 -2.82 n.a. -0.49 n.a. n.a. -2.71 -1.98
   Gross Domestic Savings 7.80 15.73 19.74 23.07 24.85 7.72 10.24 18.11
   Aid 7.23 0.04 0.05 0.08 1.04 1.36 0.97 0.82
   External Debt 65.03 51.15 43.72 51.21 95.52 22.49 41.03 53.73
Human Development and Infrastructure
Life Expectancy at birth  (years) 63.06 74.08 68.31 75.79 70.04 65.23 70.58 69.57
Immunization, DPT (% of children under 12 
months)  81.00 82.00 97.00 97.00 90.00 82.00 66.00 85.00
Hospital beds (per 1,000 people)  1.67 3.29 3.11 2.67 1.55 0.98 1.34 1.47
Total Years of Schooling (15+) 2000 5.58 8.83 4.88 7.55 6.41 3.49 6.18 7.58
Adult Illiteracy (%) 14.00 3.09 12.70 4.10 8.16 30.79 6.50 9.80
Female Illiteracy (%) 20.06 3.09 12.75 4.26 9.75 38.21 7.55 14.27
Roads, paved (% of total roads)  6.50 29.40 5.50 19.40 18.90 34.50 9.50 12.80
Roads to surface area (%) 4.90 7.75 20.18 10.55 15.23 12.97 7.25 5.67
Roads to total population (per ‘000) 6.46 5.89 10.14 5.25 3.42 1.27 5.73 2.85
Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people)  62.21 223.83 217.84 232.51 103.71 64.68 51.24 77.50
Poverty and Inequality Data
Year 1997 2001 2001 2000 1998 2000 1999 2000
PPP $1 Poverty Incidence 29.40 3.33 8.17 0.97 17.67 15.95 14.86 9.14
PPP $2 Poverty Incidence 51.69 14.31 22.43 9.58 40.77 37.36 30.29 37.71
Gini Coefficient 0.585 0.522 0.585 0.571 0.522 0.483 0.568 0.498
Source: http://www.worldbank.org/research/povmonitor/regional/Latin_America_and_the_Caribbean.htm; Barro and Lee (2000); World Bank (2003a).Table 2: Basic Economic and Human Development Indicators for Bolivia
1985-1989 1989-1994 1994-1999 1999-2002
Economic Indicators
Real GDP growth 1.62 4.08 3.93 2.18
Agriculture excluding mining 0.33 4.10 2.08 2.38
Mining -0.16 4.07 2.36 2.80
Services excluding public administration 1.21 4.94 6.93 1.47
Public Administration -0.98 1.88 3.93 2.44
Industry - Manufacturing 2.02 4.40 3.80 1.94
Export growth (goods and services) 15.56 4.08 1.54 0.02
Export growth (merchandise) 5.04 5.89 -0.89 0.09
Export growth (mineral and hydrocarbon) -0.81 -2.49 -2.81 0.18
Ave. share of mineral and hydrocarbon exports to GDP 13.68 10.17 7.57 7.65
Ave. share of agricultural exports to GDP 2.14 3.87 5.16 5.28
Current Account Deficit -5.28 -3.53 -6.05 -4.38
Budget Balance -0.38 -1.92 -2.33 -5.06
Inflation 2414.35 13.41 7.43 3.10
Savings Rate (domestic) 10.91 9.05 10.53 7.52
Investment Rate 14.42 15.15 18.70 15.09
Human Development Indicators
Population Growth  2.18 2.41 2.33 2.16
Child Mortality  146 122 97 80
Life Expectancy  56.19 58.81 61.03 62.56
Primary Enrollment (male) 100.81 103.29 111.34 116.66
Primary Enrollment (female) 89.80 94.71 106.26 115.07
Secondary Enrollment (male) 42.16 41.69 60.28 81.34
Secondary Enrollment (female) 35.92 35.74 54.54 77.87
Note: Data on GDP growth and current account is taken from UDAPE (various issues) and INE (various issues). Data 
on exports is taken from UDAPE (various Issues) and WDI (2003). All other data are taken from WDI (World Bank 
2003a), covering the years up to 2001.
Source: WDI 2003; UDAPE (various issues); INE (various issues).
Politically, Bolivia oscillated between military dictatorships and civilian rule between the 1950s and 
the early 1980s when the latest military government was replaced with a democratic one, and 
democracy has persisted ever since. Bolivia’s politics were dominated by three main political 
parties (MNR, MIR, and ADN) and a few smaller ones and all governments since 1982 have been 
coalition governments, where the coalitions only lasted for one term and then were replaced by 
another coalition among the three major parties (or coalitions involving smaller ones; all possible 
permutations of coalitions among the three major parties existed in the past 20 years); this was 
aided by the constitutional provision that a president can only serve one term in office.  All three 
parties represented the Spanish-speaking population with little representation from the indigenous 
populations. As a result of these arrangements, horse-trading and patronage became central 
elements in Bolivia’s political system, both to ensure the support of indigenous populations in 
elections and to generate coalition governments between groups with substantially different 
ideological agendas (Kaufman et al. 2003). This led to an increasing alienation and frustration of 
the population with the political process and led to the rise of powerful extra-parliamentary 
opposition forces, such as the coca growers’ union and other civil society groups, which were in 
hostile opposition to the government.
The latest election in 2002 brought major breakthroughs for new parties aligned with indigenous 
groups, which for the first time have a major representation in parliament.  In particular, a party 
allied to coca growers (MAS) was able to gain major representation in parliament.  Apart from 
representing coca growers, they have also taken on a range of populist positions on macro and trade 
issues. In this new environment, politics as usual continued and a coalition between MNR and MIR 
brought Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada back into power (he had been president before between 1993 
3and 1997). Some of the proposed reforms and measures of the government, in particular a poorly 
communicated tax reform in early 2003 and a proposal to sell liquefied natural gas via Chile to the 
USA, led to such opposition (within and outside of parliament) and civil unrest that the government 
was forced out of power in October 2003 and the vice-president, Carlos Mesa, took over as the 
constitutional successor to form an independent government. Despite enjoying some popular 
support (based on his background in media and his strong stance against corruption), he has little 
support in parliament and it is unclear whether he will be able to bring back stability to the country. 
A constitutional assembly has been called for 2005 tasked reassessing the entire political and 
economic model that has been followed in the past, with great uncertainties about what outcome 
this might generate.
Regarding economic policies, Bolivia had pursued a state-led import-substitution regime until the 
1980s, which was largely financed through the export of raw materials (tin and silver).  The first 
democratic government under Siles-Zuazo (1982-85) faced a very difficult internal (drought, social 
unrest) and external environment (debt crisis, global recession and collapse in tin prices in 1985) 
and was unable to stabilize the country but instead allowed a hyperinflation to develop which led to 
a collapse of the government in 1985. Victor Paz Estenssoro took over and first undertook a strict 
stabilization plan, which ended hyperinflation and brought back internal and external stability (for 
details see Sachs and Larrain 1998).
In addition, the Paz Estenzoro government designed and began implementation of a Nueva Politica 
Economica, which included a wide range of structural reforms, which were supported thereafter by 
structural adjustment programs of the World Bank and the IMF. These reforms , which in the early 
1990s shifted to second generation structural reforms, were continued by most of the successive 
governments so that Bolivia stands out as a country having undertaken more structural reforms in 
line with the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ than most developing countries (Rodrik 2003; Lora 
2001). They included:
¾ Product market deregulation (freeing of prices, regulation of natural monopolies)
¾ Capital market deregulation (freeing of interest rates, reduction in reserve requirements, 
liberalization of the external capital market)
¾ Fiscal reforms involving the simplification of the tax structure where a value-added tax and an 
income tax (both at 13% where individuals could deduce value-added tax payments from the 
income tax bill) became the central revenue source and tax collection increased significantly as 
a share of GDP.  On the expenditure side, there was a considerable expansion of expenditure in 
the social sectors (health and education), while expenditures on state-owned companies were 
sharply reduced through the privatization program.
¾ Trade liberalization (simplification and sharp reduction of import tariffs, elimination of non-
tariff barriers, efforts to promote non-traditional exports)
¾ Liberalization of the FDI regime (regulatory framework, investor protection, equal treatment of 
domestic and foreign investors)
¾ Restructuring, closing, and ‘capitalization’ of the large state-owned companies.  The latter refers 
to a scheme where public companies sold a 50% stake to strategic investors (where the proceeds 
remained with the companies to finance a pre-specified investment program).  The proceeds 
from the remaining shares are being used to finance an annual old age pension (the Bonosol) for 
all citizens over the age of 65.  This way, electricity, railway, telecommunications, mining, the 
national airline, and the national hydrocarbon company were transferred to (mostly foreign) 
strategic investors who took management control of these companies.
The one area where there were only few reforms was the labor market. Here, only government 
intervention in wage setting was reduced and there was some reduction in wages and benefits for 
public sector employees.  The Labor Law of 1942 is still largely in force with quite high costs of 
4dismissal, few options for temporary work, substantial requirements to meet occupational health 
and safety standards, a prohibition of employment agencies, and other regulations which were 
aimed primarily at the mining sector but have since become a stumbling bloc for a smoother 
operation of the formal labor market.
In addition, the first government of Sanchez de Lozada (1993-97) undertook an ambitious 
decentralization program in the 1994 Popular Participation Law and the 1995 Decentralisation Law, 
which transferred a considerable amount of resources (and responsibilities) to Bolivia’s 314 
municipalities.  In addition, the municipalities were also awarded all additional resources that were 
freed up as a result of the HIPC II initiative which were the focus of attention in Bolivia’s first 
PRSP, concluded in 2000.
In several dimensions, Bolivia’s structural reforms produced positive outcomes.  Macroeconomic 
stability was achieved and maintained throughout the period with low inflation, low fiscal deficits, 
and a relatively stable exchange rate. The fiscal reforms, combined with the reform of the state 
sector, ensured that the fiscal situation improved dramatically over the 1990s.  Exports, including 
non-traditional exports, improved, and there were significant improvements in human development 
indicators, particularly education (see Tables 1 and 2). While Bolivia remains a lot poorer than all 
of its neighbors, has higher poverty rates and lower life expectancy, it compares favorably in 
education indicators with some richer Latin American countries such as Guatemala or even Brazil 
(see Table 1).
2 Economic growth also improved and Bolivia grew at around 4% per year from 1990-
1998, but only about 1.5% in per capita terms.  This relatively positive performance was aided by a 
favorable external environment, with high growth of Bolivia’s main trading partners, the expansion 
of natural resource exports, and a surge in foreign direct investment that accompanied the 
capitalization process. The combination of strong memories of the 1985 hyperinflation, an open 
capital account, and high political and economic uncertainty of a small open economy led to high 
and increasing dollarization in the economy, which permeates the financial system and significantly 
limits the options for an active monetary and exchange rate policy. There were few attempts to 
combat dollarization, which is extremely high to this day.
Exports, while improving throughout the 1990s, remained largely focused on primary products with 
the mix shifting from a heavy reliance on minerals to a much greater importance of hydrobarbons 
and agricultural cash crops produced by commercial agriculture (i.e. soybeans, sugar, and wood). 
The lack of diversification and the failure to develop manufactured exports appears to be due to a 
combination of geographical factors (land-locked country, poor infrastructure, high transport costs), 
economic risks and volatility (i.e. exchange rate risks and volatility vis-à-vis trading partners), 
Dutch disease problems associated with the primary exports, and institutional constraints (weak 
protection of property rights, high corruption, contraband economy, high regulatory burden for 
start-ups, high informality of the economy, e.g. Kaufman et al. 2001; World Bank 2004b).  A 
continuing concern is also the very low domestic savings rate (see Tables 1, 2 and below), making 
Bolivia heavily dependent on capital inflows to finance investment.      
Since 1998, economic growth has decelerated to an average of only about 1.5% per year and has 
become negative in per capita terms. The main causes for this slowdown are a series of external 
economic shocks that have affected the economy, including particularly the strong devaluations and 
recessions in Brazil and Argentina in 1999 and 2002, respectively, while the Boliviano appreciated 
significantly alongside the US$. This led to a sharply overvalued currency and the (independent) 
monetary authorities did little to combat this due to the risks of devaluations in a dollarized 
economy, but instead stuck to their policy of allowing only very small devaluations against the 
dollar (some 8% in 2001, falling to 4% in 2002). Instead, the economy slowed down considerably, 
credit contracted sharply as the financial sector experienced build-up of non-performing loans; as a 
2   One should note that the findings on poverty and inequality are quite sensitive to the choice of the survey, 
and to whether income or expenditure is being used as the indicator.  When one uses expenditures and the 1999 
MECOVI survey, the Gini stands at only 0.45 and the poverty headcount of below $1 a day falls to 14.4%. We 
report the income-based figures in Table 1 as the data from the other countries are also based on incomes.
5result of the recession and costly amendments to a pension reform, budget deficits have soared to 
unsustainable levels, adding economic uncertainty to the already existing explosive political and 
social situation (World Bank 2004a).  The financing of the large budget deficit through domestic 
and international borrowing has placed Bolivia in an increasingly vulnerable situation where rising 
shares of government spending must be allocated to debt service payments, thereby partially wiping 
out some of the gains realized by the HIPC debt relief (World Bank, 2004a).  As the dollar has 
fallen recently against the currencies of Bolivia’s main trading partners and raw material prices 
have increased, the external environment has improved somewhat and growth is projected to at 
3.8% and 4.5% for 2004 and 2005, respectively.                               .
Regarding poverty and inequality trends, one first has to note that nationally representative 
household surveys  with income and expenditure information are only available from 1997 
onwards.
3 Before, there are income surveys for departmental capitals (plus El Alto) going back to 
1989, and some spotty survey information from non-urban areas (see Annex 1). Thus rural areas 
(comprising about 40% of the population in 1994, with the share falling over time) and towns 
(comprising 12% of the population in 1994 with the share rising over time) were excluded from 
these surveys.  In addition, there are three national censuses (1976, 1992, and 2001) and three 
nationally representative Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS in 1989, 1994, and 1998) none of 
which contain income information.
4  As a result there have been considerable disagreements about 
the actual trends in poverty in Bolivia as shown in Tables 1 and 2 in Annex 1 which compiles all 
poverty estimates we could find.  Nevertheless, most of the studies agree on the following three 
stylized facts: First, in the late 1990s, poverty is much higher in rural than urban areas; second, 
there was some decline in poverty in capital cities since 1989 with an upturn in poverty again after 
1997; third, non-income measures of poverty have declined stronger than income measures 
throughout the 1990s, particularly in urban areas.  
For the purposes of this study, it was critical to generate nationally representative poverty data 
going as far back as 1989.  In order to achieve this, we employed two alternative methodologies to 
generate national poverty data and poverty profiles for the time prior to 1997.   The first uses 
information from the DHS to generate an asset index as a proxy for income following proposals 
from Sahn and Stiefel (2003) and Pritchett and Filmer (2001). Due to limitations in the data, we can 
do this only for 1994 and 1998.
5   The second combines information from the urban household 
surveys with the DHS to generate income and poverty information for the entire country from 1989 
to 2002. The precise methodology and all of the statistical and econometric issues are discussed in 
Annex 1.  
The most important results regarding poverty and inequality, based on the second methodology, are 
summarized in Table 3 below.  We present our main estimates but also include (in brackets) the 
results of a sensitivity analysis of one of our key assumptions underlying the simulation which 
might lead to an overestimate in the decline of poverty in rural areas.
6  Moreover, one should note 
3   The 1997 survey is also not comparable to later surveys so that a consistent national time series only 
emerges in 1999.
4   There are further restrictions on the DHS.   The 1989 DHS only includes households with women of 
reproductive age (15-49), while the later ones include a representative sample.  The 2003 DHS is due to be out in 
June. We will be able to report on some summary information from the survey which was made available to us 
below. 
5   We are also not convinced that this approach will be appropriate for inter-temporal comparisons of welfare 
and poverty as changes in tastes and relative prices might systematically distort such an inter-temporal assessment. 
See Annex 1 for a further discussion. We nevertheless used this method primarily as a robustness check on our other 
approach.
6   In particular, we assume that the difference in returns to assets and endowments between rural, urban, and 
capital cities did not change between 1989 and 1999. In our sensitivity analyses we replace the fixed difference 
assumption with the assumption that the difference in the impact of assets moved in accordance with the overall 
growth rates or rural areas, towns, and capital cities which show that rural incomes increased more slowly than 
incomes elsewhere.  
6that the use of consumption (including auto-consumption) as the welfare measure in rural areas and 
income as the welfare measure in capital cities (the nine departmental capitals and the city of El 
Alto) and towns (all other cities and towns), as is standard practice in Bolivia (e.g. INE-UDAPE, 
2002), will lead to lower levels of inequality compared to using incomes in rural areas which are 
reported to be considerably smaller. Using incomes for rural areas as well would raise the Gini in 
2002 to about 0.598.  But as incomes in rural areas are implausibly low (about 25% lower than 
consumption with many households reported extremely low incomes--including incomes from own-
consumed goods--that are impossible to survive on), we believe that it is preferable to stick to the 
mixed definition.
7   Lastly, we should point out that the poverty lines used here are based a 
regionally differentiated basket of goods that allows sufficient caloric consumption which has been 
updated using local price data on these goods.  The extreme poverty line is derived by just allowing 
for enough caloric consumption while the moderate poverty line also makes allowance for non-food 
items (see annex 1 for further discussion).  As will be shown below (and in annex 1), the updating 
of the poverty line is not in line with the developments of overall prices as the prices of the poor 
have risen less than the overall CPI.    
With   these   caveats   in   mind,   the   following   observations   are   noteworthy:
First, using our methodology, we are able to reproduce actual poverty trends in capital cities (where 
we have actual data for comparison) fairly well, particularly for the poverty gap measure, which is 
quite reassuring. We tend to slightly underpredict the headcount ratio (poverty rate) most of the 
time but also here, the most important trends (in capital cities where we can make a comparison) are 
accurately reflected.
8   Second, consistent with other studies, there is a steep gradient in poverty 
levels between capital cities, towns, and rural areas, with poverty being much higher in the latter. 
As far as the poverty rate is concerned, this differential between capital cities and rural areas gets 
larger over time (from about 25 percentage points in 1989 to nearly 29 percentage points in 2002). 
This is not true, however, when we consider the poverty gap, for which the differential gap has 
somewhat narrowed. This suggests that the very poor have been able to make some gains in the 
1990s while rural dwellers close to the poverty line did not benefit as much. Third, there is a clear 
poverty trend in capital cities, which closely mirrors macroeconomic conditions. Thus poverty 
(using the headcount or the poverty gap measure) declines considerably between 1989 and 1999 and 
then increases again between 1999 and 2002.  In towns and rural areas, in contrast, the dynamics of 
poverty are not as closely aligned to macroeconomic developments. In particular, there is no 
poverty reduction at all in rural areas between 1989 and 1994, then considerable poverty reduction 
between 1994 and 1999, and stagnation (headcount) or slight further reductions (poverty gap) 
between 1999 and 2002.  Note also that the pace of poverty reduction in rural areas is smaller in our 
sensitivity analysis but does not change the general picture (see figures in brackets).  
Using the first approach (see Annex 1 for tables and discussion) to generate poverty data largely 
confirms the findings above for the time period 1994 to 1998, but with some slightly different 
nuances.  While the asset index which we use as a proxy for incomes increases overall and in all 
three regions, which is consistent with the findings above, the increase in the asset index is largest 
in towns, followed by capital cities, and smallest in rural areas (see Annex 1), suggesting that rural 
poverty reduction measured this way has been somewhat smaller than urban poverty reduction.  
Regarding inequality, the trends follow closely the poverty discussion, but with some additional 
features.  In particular, the sharp increase in inequality in capital cities between 1999 and 2002 is 
noteworthy. Measures that are more sensitive to the bottom of the distribution, such as the Atkinson 
measure with e=2, show even more dramatic deteriorations (see Annex 1) suggesting that the urban 
7   At the same time, we acknowledge that using consumption in one area and income in another may also lead 
to biases that are hard to quantify.  It is not possible to use expenditure throughout as expenditure data are not 
available prior to 1999.
8   In Annex 1 (Table 5), we show that most of the differences in our prediction are due to our specification of 
the error term in the underlying regression where we assume a normal distribution.   We will experiment with other 
distributional assumption to address this issue.  
7poor have fared particularly badly in the last few years. In other areas, inequality seems to have 
fallen and thereby somewhat offsetting the dramatic worsening of inequality in capital cities. 
Overall, the Gini in 2002 is similar to 1989.  It thus appears that the fate of the urban population, 
including the urban poor, has been closely linked to macro developments and has recently led to a 
significant deterioration in poverty and inequality.  In contrast, the much poorer rural poor have 
been more detached from improvements and deteriorations in the overall economic environment 
and their poverty trends have followed another logic. 
Table 3: Poverty and Inequality Trends using Moderate Poverty Line*
1989 1994 1999 2002
Observed Simulated Observed Simulated Observed Simulated Observed
Headcount


































Capital Cities** 0.505 0.497 0.481 0.455 0.480 0.488 0.540
Towns 0.547 0.537 0.455 0.500 0.452
Rural 0.475 0.497 0.423 0.443 0.421
Total 0.555 0.555 0.525 0.531 0.551
*The moderate poverty line is, in line with standard practice in Bolivia, applied to income in urban areas, and 
consumption in rural areas (as income data are considered not to be reliable there and consumption data are not 
available for the urban household surveys prior to 1997).  While the extreme poverty line in Bolivia is only based on 
ensuring adequate nutrition, the moderate poverty line also makes allowance for some non-food expenditures.  The 
moderate poverty line stood at about US$40 per capita and month, the extreme poverty line at about US$20.  For details 
on the poverty lines and the results for the extreme poverty line, refer to annex 1.    
**Capital cities refer to the 9 departmental capitals and El Alto (the city adjacent to La Paz).
+ The figures in brackets refer to sensitivity analyses which no longer assume that the impact of endowments on growth 
did not change between urban and rural areas between 1989 and 1998 but that it changed in proportion with the 
differential in aggregate growth performance in the three areas.  See Annex 1 for details and full results.   
8One should point out that Bolivia’s record in non-income dimensions of poverty is considerably 
more favorable than its record in income poverty reduction.  As shown in Table 2, Bolivia has 
achieved impressive improvements in the reduction of child mortality and the expansion of primary 
and secondary education.  More recent data suggest that the decline in infant and child mortality as 
well as the expansion of reproductive services and immunization coverage has continued at a rapid 
pace, including in rural areas (INE, 2004), while education data suggest that the poorest quintile 
have (in contrast to richer groups) suffered from slight declines in enrolment and attendance rates 
(World Bank 2004b).   The index of unsatisfied basic needs which combines information on 
housing, sanitation, education, and health care, also shows strong improvements between 1992 and 
2001; but the improvements are much smaller in rural areas where in 2001 91% of the population 
continues to suffer from unsatisfied basic needs (see Annex 1 and World Bank, 2004b).   The 
apparent disconnect between rapidly improving social indicators and only moderate improvements 
in income poverty are one of the conundrums of Bolivia’s economy (see below).  
Chapter 2: Analysis of Growth and Its Distributional and Poverty Impact
Growth Decomposition and Pro-Poor Growth.  Two ways to provide further insights about the 
links between poverty, inequality, and growth trends is to do a decomposition of the observed 
poverty reduction and provide estimates of the rates of pro poor growth (Datt and Ravallion 1992; 
Ravallion and Chen, 2003).  The decomposition of the observed poverty reduction into a growth 
and an inequality contribution (and an interaction term which cancels if one the average of a 
‘forward’ and ‘backward’ decomposition) is using the methods proposed by Ravallion and Datt 
(1992).  As discussed in detail in the Grimm and Günther (2004), the distribution component in this 
decomposition also implicitly includes the impact of changes in the real value of the poverty line 
(i.e. how prices paid by the poor have moved relative to the overall price level).  As shown in Table 
4 of Annex 1, the prices paid by the poor (in particular food prices) have risen somewhat less than 
the overall price level (particularly in recent years) so that the purchasing power of the poor has 
increased by more than suggested by the change in their real incomes.  This is implicitly captured in 
the decomposition as a distributional shift favoring the poor.  
Table 4 – Growth Inequality Decompostion of Poverty Changes (Moderate Poverty)
  1989–1999 1999–2002 1989–2002
Total Bolivia
Change in poverty  -0.118 0.020 -0.099
Growth component -0.080 0.018 -0.064
Redistribution component -0.038 0.002 -0.035
Departmental Capitals
Change in poverty  -0.163 0.040 -0.123
Growth component -0.105 0.025 -0.080
Redistribution component -0.057 0.015 -0.043
Other Urban Areas
Change in poverty  -0.117 -0.015 -0.132
Growth component -0.067 0.017 -0.074
Redistribution component -0.050 -0.032 -0.058
Rural Areas
Change in poverty  -0.068 0.005 -0.064
Growth component -0.041 -0.005 -0.039
Redistribution component -0.028 0.010 -0.025
Notes: Calculated using the Datt-Ravaillion (1992) method of growth-
inequaltiy decomposition.  
Source: Own calculations.  For the extreme poverty line, see Table 12 in Annex 1.
9The result of the decomposition analysis (Table 4) for the entire period show that about two-thirds 
of the 10 percentage point decline in poverty for total Bolivia is attributable to growth, and about 
one-third to a distributional shift favoring the poor.
  9   As the income distribution hardly shifted 
between the two periods (see Table 3)
10, most of this distributional shift is actually due to the 
poverty line effect which increased the real purchasing power of the poor.  Considering sub-periods 
and different parts of the country shows a more differentiated picture.  In the period 1989-99 both 
the growth and redistribution (and/or poverty line) effect served to reduce poverty in all parts of the 
country.  In the latter three years, the picture has changed drastically.  Now poverty has increased in 
capital cities nationally, and particularly in capital cities where 60% is due to falling incomes and 
40% due to adverse distributional shifts.  
When one splits out this poverty line effect from the distributional component (results not shown), 
we find that ‘pure’ redistribution helped to lower poverty in all of Bolivia between 1989 and 1999 
as well as capital cities and towns, while the redistribution component was essentially zero in rural 
areas.  Between 1999 and 2002, the redistribution component served to increase poverty in all 
regions and Bolivia as a whole.  For the overall period (1989-2002), this ‘pure’ redistribution effect 
had a slightly poverty-increasing effect for Bolivia as a whole so that the poverty decline that 
happened occurred mostly due to growth and a favorable development of the prices paid by the 
poor.  This adverse distributional effect is entirely driven by an adverse distributional shift in capital 
cities which dominates a favorable distributional shift in towns and rural areas.    
A second way to examine the linkages between growth, inequality, and poverty is the Ravallion-
Chen measure of Pro-poor Growth which takes the average of growth rates of the quantiles of the 
population that were poor in the initial period (see Ravallion and Chen 2003).
11  The growth 
incidence curves underlying this analysis are shown below for the entire period (1989-2002); for 
sub-periods they are available in Annex 1.  For the entire country and the entire period, they are 
above 0 for all groups, and moderately downward sloping from the 10
th  to the 90
th  percentile 
suggesting that, on the whole, the poor gained proportionately more from growth than the rich. 
This is not true below the 10
th percentile and above the 90
th percentile suggesting that the extremely 
poor were not benefiting as much and that the very rich were benefiting more from growth.
12 
Matters are different when one considers the different parts of the country.  In departmental capitals 
(and El Alto), growth over the period was anti-poor with the poor gaining less than the rich 
(particularly due to the influence of the period after 1999), while it was strongly pro-poor in towns, 
and moderately pro poor in rural areas.   
 The annual rate of pro poor growth, shown in Table 5, summarizes the information provided in the 
growth incidence curves.
13  We also show the results of our sensitivity analysis for towns and rural 
9    This changes very slightly in our sensitivity analysis which is available on request.  
10  Whether income distribution in Bolivia worsened between 1989 and 2002 is sensitive to the choice of inequality 
indicators which give different weights to different parts of the distribution.   But all show that whatever 
distributional shifts occurred were small.
11   There are various criticisms of this approach of measuring pro-poor growth some of which can be found in 
Klasen (2004).  
12  One should note that measurement error might have a considerable influence at the two tails of the distribution so 
that these results should be treated with some caution.
13  We should point out that Jimenez and Landa (2004) from UDAPE have, for the World Bank poverty assessment 
(World Bank 2004b), also been calculating rates of pro poor growth using the Ravallion and Chen method whose 
results, on the surface are quite different from ours.  Their growth incidence curves for 1999-2002 point to sharply 
rising inequality in rural areas and somewhat rising inequality in urban areas (combining capital cities and towns); 
the calculated annual rates of pro poor growth are -6% per year.  Where we use the same information (per capita 
incomes for capital cities between 1999 and 2002), our findings are virtually identical.  The most important reasons 
for the discrepancy appear to be that they use income as the welfare indicator in rural areas while we use 
consumption, in line with the usual practice in Bolivia.  Using the income indicator for rural areas shows massive 
declines in per capita income which are implausible in two ways.  First, they imply income levels in rural areas that 
are unlikely to assure basic survival and second the growth rates, -20% per year for the poorest quintile over three 
10areas (and by implication, all Bolivia) in brackets.  The most important findings are the following. 
Overall, there was Pro Poor Growth between 1.9 and 2.2% per year between 1989 and 2002, which 
was mostly due to high pro poor growth in towns and some pro poor growth in rural areas, while 
pro poor growth in capital cities was negligible.  As before, it is useful to consider sub-periods. 
Between 1989 and 1999, there was a considerable amount of pro-poor growth in total Bolivia, in 
capital cities, towns, and rural areas, regardless of the poverty line. Also, the rate of pro-poor 
growth exceeded the growth rate in the mean, suggesting that growth was accompanied by falling 
inequality. The particularly high growth rate in total Bolivia (2.23%) is due to growth in the three 
areas plus a shift in the composition of the population from the poorer rural areas to the richer urban 
areas.  Between 1999 and 2002, we find that there was a strongly anti-poor contraction in capital 
cities, wiping out most of the gains the urban poor have made in the ten previous years. In other 
urban areas, the contraction was not particularly anti-poor so that the poor had roughly stagnant 
incomes. In rural areas, incomes continued to rise, although very slowly, and growth continued to 
be somewhat higher for the poor than for the non-poor.  Given that the rural poor predominate 
among the poor, overall growth was only slightly anti-poor between 1999 and 2002, and this 
finding is sensitive to the choice of the poverty line.  In the sensitivity analysis, growth and pro poor 
growth is somewhat smaller in total Bolivia and more significantly so in rural areas which hardly 
experienced any growth mean income growth between 1989 and 2002; but the rates of pro- poor 
growth remain between 1.2 and 1.4% suggesting that    the poor were able to make some gains over 
the   period.                                          
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years, is not consistent with all the known information about economic developments between 1999 and 2002 
(where per capita incomes declined slightly, but not by these magnitudes).  For the period prior to 1999 (1993-
1999), they calculate only very moderate pro poor growth rates in capital cities, in contrast to our higher figures; this 
discrepancy is probably largely due to the different time periods considered.  Beginning in 1993 omits high (and 
pro-poor) growth from 1989 to 1993.  Thus we find those figures to be roughly consistent with ours (which they 
should given that we both use incomes and use a similar income definition).   
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With the exception of the strongly anti-poor growth in capital cities in recent years, it appears that 
growth has been quite pro-poor throughout most of the last 15 years, and particularly so in towns 
and (moderately so) in rural areas. One may wonder how this squares with the results in Table 3 
which showed only slowly falling poverty rates in rural areas in the 1990s.  But these results are 
entirely consistent with each other when one notes that the depth of poverty in rural areas is so large 
that even considerable pro-poor growth does not lift many of the poor above the poverty line (but 
does reduce the poverty gap as indeed happened, particularly between 1994 and 1999).  Thus the 
problem of Bolivia’s poverty is not so much that growth in the 1990s has been biased against the 
poor, but that overall growth has not been very high throughout the period and that the initial 
inequality was so large that the poor remained poor despite some improvements in incomes. It 
would probably have taken another decade of such growth to make serious inroads into poverty, 
particularly in rural areas. Unfortunately, that did not happen.  With the type of growth experienced 
since 1999, rural poverty will not change much and urban poverty is on a sharply increasing trend. 
13Table 5: Annual Pro-poor Growth Rates (per Capita)
1989 - 2002 1989 – 1999 1999 - 2002
Total Bolivia
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Growth Rate in the Mean 1.19 2.01 -1.51
Mean of Growth Rates for
Extremely Poor 0.44 2.56 -6.30
Moderately Poor 0.48 2.58 -6.44
All 0.69 2.50 -5.01
Other Urban Areas
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Source: Own calculations. Growth rates use the actually observed levels of income/expenditure where 
available (in capital cities throughout and elsewhere from 1999 onwards).  Figures in brackets are 
based on sensitivity analysis as discussed in text (footnote 6) and in Annex 1.
(Sectoral) Sources and Proximate Determinants of Growth. Before discussing the determinants 
of pro-poor growth, it is important to first discuss the sources of overall growth in Bolivia in the 
past 15 years. Table 6 gives an overview over the sectoral composition of GDP and its growth. 
Regarding the sectoral composition of GDP in 2002, agriculture makes up about 14%, about half of 
which is subsistence agriculture where many of the rural poor live. About 10% of GDP is generated 
by mines, oil, and gas and only about 16% by manufacturing. Most of this manufacturing consists 
of food processing and the processing of raw materials (wood, oil, and minerals), with hardly any 
light or heavy industry present in the country.   The remainder of GDP consists of services of 
various kinds, which includes mostly services that involve the rural and urban poor (such as trade 
and transport services).  Employment shares differ radically from this sectoral composition of GDP 
(see Table 7). Agriculture employs 60% of the workforce, sales employs another 10% of the 
workforce, while manufacturing, oil and gas, and high-value services employ only a small fraction 
14of the workforce. Thus Bolivia is a highly dualistic economy with a large employment in low value 
agriculture and the small-scale service sector and very small employment in manufacturing. 
Overall GDP growth between 1989 and 1999 was driven largely by sharp growth in commercial 
agriculture, oil and gas production (and associated construction and production in the electricity, 
gas and water sector), some small-scale food processing industries, and some services.  In contrast, 
subsistence agriculture, mining, hotels and restaurants, and public administration grew less than 
proportionately.  Between 1999 and 2002, virtually all sectors grew slower, with the exception of 
oil and gas, which expanded production due to enhanced exports to Brazil.  The figures for coca 
production show a continuous and sharp decline between 1989 and 2002. This decline in reported 
coca production is very likely overstating the actual decline.   While eradication efforts were 
intensified throughout the 1990s, the enforcement varied considerably.  It was particularly strong 
under the Banzer regime (1997-2002), but it is still likely that clandestine production is much larger 
than reported here (and it is also likely that coca production increased considerably recently as 
enforcement has flagged).
One should also note that the oil, gas and mineral sectors only account for about 10% of Bolivia’s 
GDP and less than 1% of its employment, but more than 40% of Bolivia’s exports, so that the 
importance of these sectors for Bolivia’s external position is much larger than its GDP share.  Thus 
we find that Bolivia has a highly dualistic economy, with the most dynamic sectors being the oil 
and gas sector, industrial agriculture (concentrated in the lowlands) and some high-value service 
sectors.  The remainder of the economy showed a much more moderate evolution.
TFP Analysis.   Another way to examine the proximate sources of growth is to examine the 
influence of input factors (labor, capital, human capital) and the residual component, total factor 
productivity (TFP).  This can be done using a growth accounting framework based on the Solow 
growth model and is such an analysis was done by Loayza et al. (2002).  Depending on whether 
human capital and the input factors are adjusted for capital utilization, the results show that the 
contribution of capital to GDP growth was negative on average in the 1981-1990 period (-0.26 to 
-0.31% per year) indicating very low investment rates.   Similarly, TFP growth was negative 
indicating worsening efficiency.   In the 1991-2000 period, things turned around with capital 
contributing about 0.45% to annual growth and TFP contributing about 1.23-1.66% per year 
depending on the assumptions.  Labor throughout both periods contributed about 1.4-1.7% per year 
and its contribution was very stable.   While the findings for the crisis-ridden 1980s are to be 
expected, the remarkable finding for the 1990s is the very low capital contribution to growth, 
suggesting very low investment rates that are barely able to make up for depreciation.  This, in turn, 
is related to Bolivia’s very low domestic savings rate (Table 1) which, even with generous aid and 
capital inflows, leads to only a moderate investment rate and thus quite low growth attributable to 
capital deepening (see Table 2 and below). 
     
15Table 6: Sectoral Composition of GDP and its Growth, 1989–2002
Production in 1990 Bs ('000) Annual Growth
1989 1999 2002 1989-99 1999-2002
A. PRIVATE SECTOR 11876 18054 19209 4.3 2.1
   1. AGRICULTURE 2267 3071 3296 3.1 2.4
      - Non-industrial Agricultural Products 1062 1358 1437 2.5 1.9
      - Industrial Agricultural Products 212 558 605 10.2 2.7
      - Coca 193 74 39 -9.1 -18.9
      - Cattle and other Livestock 669 896 1005 3.0 3.9
      - Forestry, Hunting and Fishing 130 185 211 3.6 4.5
   2. MINING AND QUARRYING 1470 2017 2191 3.2 2.8
      - Crude Oil and Natural Gas  644 978 1189 4.3 6.7
      - Metal and Non-Metal Minerals 826 1039 1002 2.3 -1.2
   3. MANUFACTURING 2430 3633 3849 4.1 1.9
      - Food, Drinks and Tobacco  1109 1745 1975 4.6 4.2
      - Other Industries 1321 1889 1874 3.6 -0.3
   4. ELECTRICITY, GAS, AND WATER 235 452 475 6.7 1.7
   5. CONSTRUCTION 462 819 819 5.9 0.0
   6. TRADE AND COMMERCE 1270 1820 1937 3.7 2.1
   7. LOGISTICS & COMMUNICATIONS 1365 2331 2562 5.5 3.2
   8. FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS SERVICES 1528 3161 3103 7.5 -0.6
      - Financial Services 242 974 914 14.9 -2.1
      - Business Services 382 1113 1040 11.3 -2.2
      - Real Estate 904 1075 1149 1.7 2.3
   9. PERSONAL SERVICES (INCKL. DOMESTIC SERVICES) 667 973 1073 3.8 3.3
   10. RESTAURANTS Y HOTELS 507 688 734 3.1 2.2
   11. IMPUTED BANKING SERVICES -234 -911 -830 14.5 -3.1
B. PUBLIC SECTOR 1570 1991 2140 2.4 2.4
TOTAL A AT FACTOR COSTS 13537 20045 21350 4.0 2.1
   INDIRECT TAXES 1222 1764 1916 3.7 2.8
TOTAL AT MARKET PRICES 14759 21809 23266 4.0 2.2
Source: UDAPE (various isues).
Table 7: Employment Shares, 1999
A. PRIVATE SECTOR 2528708 95.1%
   1. AGRICULTURE 1598358 60.1%
   2. MINING AND QUARRYING 44051 1.7%
   3. MANUFACTURING 249167 9.4%
   4. ELECTRICITY, GAS, AND WATER 3986 0.1%
   5. CONSTRUCTION 116845 4.4%
   6. TRADE AND COMMERCE 253974 9.5%
   7. LOGISTICS & COMMUNICATIONS 66776 2.5%
   8. FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS SERVICES 12802 0.5%
   9. PERSONAL SERVICES (INCKL. DOMESTIC SERVICES) 107401 4.0%
   10. RESTAURANTS AND HOTELS 75348 2.8%
B. PUBLIC SECTOR 131464 4.9% 
TOTAL 2660172 100.0%
 Source: MECOVI survey.
Poverty Profile. These analyses have so far provided quite an aggregative picture of developments 
in poverty as well as of GDP growth.  We now turn to a detailed poverty profile to give a better 
sense of who and where the poor are, and what they mainly live off.  In Tables 8 and 9, we present 
16our results for the poverty gap, which also captures the depth of poverty.
14  Apart from the already 
noted rural-urban divide, there are very large regional variations in the poverty gap in the different 
departments.  In particular, poverty gaps are very high in the two highland and valley departments 
of Chuquisaca and Potosi, while they are much lower in the lowland departments of Santa Cruz, 
Beni, Pando, and the valley department of Tarija. The former two provinces are particularly 
dependent on subsistence agriculture, while the latter three are the home to large-scale farming, as 
well as most oil and gas production. The three provinces La Paz, Oruro, and Cochabamba take on 
an intermediary position.  
Table 8: Regional Disaggregation of the Poverty Gap
Moderate Poverty Gap Extreme Poverty Gap
1989 1994 1999 2002 1989 1994 1999 2002
Total 45.45 41.89 32.53 32.94 27.53 25.21 15.73 15.32
(0.35) (0.25) (0.34) (0.22)
By Type of Municipality
City 32.92 25.74 21.02 24.37 15.29 9.58 8.00 9.79
Town 51.31 44.68 34.70 32.88 34.10 27.02 13.97 13.10
(0.92) (0.69) (0.90) (0.63)
Rural 58.30 60.90 47.71 44.86 39.13 43.33 27.37 23.88
(0.50) (0.34) (0.57) (0.38)
By Department
Chuquisaca 58.81 60.79 53.94 49.16 40.34 44.86 35.43 29.12
(0.81) (0.70) (0.90) (0.74)
La Paz 45.19 37.11 35.12 33.53 26.48 20.09 18.04 16.48
(0.70) (0.50) (0.66) (0.46)
Cochabamba 43.02 41.97 30.20 36.30 24.66 23.68 12.44 17.14
(0.83) (0.76) (0.81) (0.62)
Oruro 48.27 49.55 34.57 36.15 30.67 33.34 15.76 18.36
(0.82) (0.70) (0.79) (0.69)
Potosí 64.69 63.87 50.53 47.24 49.40 50.62 30.24 26.99
(0.73) (0.58) (0.93) (0.64)
Tarija 50.78 50.27 28.92 28.67 31.16 30.46 12.19 9.21
(0.75) (0.74) (0.75) (0.62)
Santa Cruz 31.41 28.16 20.47 23.97 14.84 12.48 6.92 8.44
(0.81) (0.57) (0.66) (0.46)
Beni & Pando 47.05 50.11 20.03 26.66 26.90 31.05 4.20 8.77
(0.84) (0.83) (0.80) (0.78)
Source: Own calculations. Standard errors are in brackets (only applicable to the simulated poverty rates). For 1999 and 2002, we use 
the actual poverty rates.  
Regarding household characteristics of the poor, large households, those with many dependents, 
and those with a young head are significantly poorer, although the latter influence is quite small. 
This suggests an important influence of fertility on pro-poor growth, where fertility decline could 
make a significant contribution to the decline of poverty and inequality (see Box 1).  Particularly 
striking are the very large differences in poverty by language and education.  The poverty gap of 
those speaking an indigenous language is nearly twice as large when the moderate poverty line is 
applied, and three times as large when the extreme poverty line is used.  Similarly, there is hardly 
any poverty among those with more than completed secondary education, while there are very high 
poverty rates among those with less than 5 years of schooling.  Given the differences between 
employment shares and sectoral contributions to GDP (as shown in Tables 5 and 6), it is not 
surprising to find considerable differences in poverty rates by the sectoral employment of the 
household head.  In particular, those working in agriculture have a much larger poverty gap than 
14   The poverty gap index (or P1 from the FGT family of indices) divides the percentage average shortfall of 
the poor from the poverty line with the total population.  Other results can be found in Annex 1.  We should note 
that the surveys were not designed to be representative at the level of departments so that the results presented here 
should be treated with some caution (particularly in the case of the smaller departments such as Beni and Pando).  
17those working in any other profession.  Unemployed heads also have very large poverty rates while 
the poverty rate among white-collar workers is predictably low.  It is also interesting to note that the 
gender of the household head does not appear to have a big impact on poverty. If anything, female-
headed households are less poor than male-headed households, a finding common to many Latin 
American countries (see Marcoux 1998).  Similarly, education gaps by gender, an important cause 
of poverty, have largely disappeared.  But females continue to be disadvantaged in other ways, 
particularly in the labor market but also in the household (see Box 2).  
There are no dramatic trends in terms of changes of the characteristics of the poor over time.
15  But 
a few changes are noteworthy.   In particular, the poverty gap in Chuquisaca appears to have 
declined the least so that it surpassed Potosi as the poorest province by 2002. In contrast, in Tarija, 
Beni and Pando, poverty reduction appears to have been particularly rapid. As far as household 
characteristics are concerned, small households appear to have reduced poverty more rapidly than 
large households, particularly in relative terms.   While the absolute reduction for the poorly 
educated and those speaking indigenous languages were larger than for others, in relative terms it 
was smaller so that the relative gap between them and the rest has widened.  Similarly, the relative 
gap between farming households and while-collar households has widened considerably in the past 
15 years even if the poverty gap was reduced considerably in farming households.  
Using the asset index confirms most of the results shown above, but in a somewhat more 
accentuated fashion (see Annex 1).  The difference between rural areas, towns, and capital cities in 
the asset index is larger than in the simulated incomes leading to starker differences in poverty rates 
between the three areas.  The poverty profile confirms that larger households
16 and those with less 
educated and younger household heads are poorer, and find even stronger differences in poverty 
rates by language and education of the household head and spouse.  Also here, female-headed 
households are less poor than male-headed ones.  Thus we find large and significant differences in 
poverty rates among different groups.  
Accounting for Inequality Change. It is useful to further examine the causes of the observed 
changes in inequality over the past 10 years.  Here we draw on findings from Gasparini et al (2003), 
which decompose changes in inequality in (equivalized) household labor income in capital cities 
between 1993 and 1997 and urban and rural areas from 1997 to 2002.   Between 1993 and 1997, 
they find a slight increase in household labor income in capital cities which is mostly driven by a 
rising employment gap between the highly educated and the less educated, a slight shift in 
educational inequality, and a significant increase of in the returns to unobservable characteristics, 
while returns to education were equalizing.  Between 1997 and 2002, inequality in household labor 
incomes increased considerably in capital cities and here all factors (returns to education, inequality 
in employment, inequality in education, and inequality in returns to unobservables) all contributed 
to this rise in inequality.
17   The importance of the rising inequality in unobservables points to 
increasing disparities in the returns to characteristics such as educational quality, labor market 
connections, and unmeasured skills.  While reducing educational and employment inequality would 
serve to reduce inequality and thus help with poverty reduction, the high returns to inequality in 
unobservables points to deeper segmentations of the Bolivian economy, to which we turn now.    
15   To a limited extent, this is true by construction as we use correlates of incomes to simulate incomes which 
include the characteristics listed in the table.  But since we allow these correlates to vary over time, we would be 
able to discern if there have been significant changes in the determinants of poverty.  
16   The effect of household size on poverty is found to be smaller using the asset index than with the simulated 
per capita incomes.  This is to be expected given that large households are likely to possess more assets and thus 
appear less poor in an asset-based index than in an income-based one.  See also the discussion below.   
17  In rural areas they find declines in inequality between 1997 and 2002.    As this is based on reported labor income, 
it only captures a small portion of the rural economy.  
18Table 9: Disaggregation of the Poverty Gap by Household Characteristics (Total Bolivia)
Moderate Poverty Gap Extreme Poverty Gap
1989 1994 1999 2002 1989 1994 1999 2002
Total 45.45 41.89 32.53 32.94 27.53 25.21 15.73 15.32
(0.35) (0.25) (0.34) (0.22)
By Hh Size
<=3 38.52 31.35 19.48 17.21 20.94 16.19 7.24 5.70
(0.83) (0.60) (0.78) (0.45)
4-6 42.88 40.86 29.51 30.17 25.09 24.14 13.93 13.34
(0.45) (0.31) (0.44) (0.29)
>=7 54.88 53.74 43.48 42.76 36.50 35.79 22.56 21.75
(0.67) (0.47) (0.71) (0.46)
By Age of Hh Head
<=34 47.04 41.79 33.79 33.59 28.48 24.30 16.47 14.78
(0.62) (0.41) (0.60) (0.36)
35-49 45.92 42.89 33.45 34.97 28.12 26.22 16.37 16.97
(0.52) (0.36) (0.52) (0.35)
50-65 42.78 39.03 27.74 27.66 25.16 23.46 12.43 12.65
(0.79) (0.61) (0.77) (0.47)
>=66 41.73 44.57 34.33 30.57 25.78 30.39 17.80 12.98
(1.45) (0.95) (1.33) (0.89)
By # of Hh Members Between 15 and 65 Years to Total Hh Members
<= 0.5 52.02 50.23 40.15 40.90 33.27 32.00 20.83 19.97
(0.41) (0.30) (0.42) (0.30)
> 0.5 36.45 31.29 23.45 23.52 19.67 16.59 9.66 9.82
(0.54) (0.41) (0.50) (0.29)
By Language of Hh Head
Spanish 38.80 32.51 21.34 23.03 21.40 16.39 7.80 8.30
(0.40) (0.33) (0.34) (0.26)
Indigenous 64.48 63.80 44.18 42.14 45.08 45.83 24.00 21.83
(0.67) (0.42) (0.78) (0.48)
By Gender of Hh Head
Male 46.23 42.80 32.87 33.61 28.31 26.11 16.06 15.55
(0.40) (0.27) (0.38) (0.25)
Female 41.45 37.49 30.62 28.81 23.55 20.91 13.91 13.90
(0.78) (0.62) (0.85) (0.52)
By Average Education of Respondents and Partners
<=5 58.88 60.30 49.35 47.76 39.07 42.14 28.28 26.03
(0.48) (0.37) (0.52) (0.39)
6-12 35.61 32.98 28.29 27.97 18.06 15.48 11.23 10.76
(0.59) (0.46) (0.50) (0.34)
>=13 13.44 10.12 6.33 7.52 4.55 2.96 1.10 1.83
(1.00) (0.59) (0.59) (0.33)























































Source: Own calculations. Standard errors are in brackets (only applicable to the simulated poverty rates).  For 1999 and 2002, we use the actual 
poverty rates.  In the DHS, the employment of the head is not listed directly and can only indirectly be inferred by the employment of the 
partner of the women who was the respondent.  In some cases, this partner of the respondent might not be the head of household so that 
there might be some inaccuracies here.  For 1999 and 2002, the head’s employment is listed in the data and we do not need to rely on the 
partner’s employment status (and thus the option of ‘no respondent’ no longer exists).  The change in poverty between 1994 and 1999 by 
head’s employment should therefore be interpreted with some caution.    
19Box 1:
Population Growth, Household Size, Poverty, and Pro-poor Growth
Bolivia has a surprisingly high population growth rate.   The intercensal annual growth rate of the 
population went up from 2.1% between 1976 and 1992 to over 2.7% between 1992 and 2001 (INE 2003a). 
Based on revised census counts, officials at INE argue that the correct intercensal growth rates would be 
2.4% for both periods, which still indicate very high population growth by South American standards (see 
Table 1).  Part of the high population growth is due to continued high fertility.  The 2001 census estimates 
the TFR to be at 4.4, while the DHS 2003 reports it to be at 3.8 (INE, 2003b; INE, 2004).  The impact of 
this TFR (and the much higher levels of TFR in the past) generates a considerable demographic 
momentum through the impact of large increases in the number of women of reproductive age.  The 
second source of high population growth has been a sharp fall in mortality levels in the past 15 years and 
as such is a welcome development (see Table 2).
There has been a considerable fertility decline in the past 20 years, which is now clearly visible in 
the age structure of the population where the absolute number of 0-4 year olds has recently begun to 
decline.  If these trends continue, Bolivia will soon be about to enter the phase which has been referred to 
as a ‘demographic gift’ by Bloom and Williamson (1998), where the share of the working age population 
will be particularly large (and dependency rates correspondingly low), enabling the country to save more, 
to invest more in the quality of children, and, if employment opportunities are there for the large working 
age population, to boost growth of per capita incomes.  
The ‘demographic gift’ is likely to make growth more pro-poor as it is particularly the poor who 
are now in the process of further reducing their household size and thus benefiting from reduced 
dependency rates (see also Klasen 2003; Klasen and Woltermann, 2004; Eastwood and Lipton 2001). This 
can be seen when considering two factors.  First, as shown in Table 8, poverty rates are highly correlated 
with household size. This also holds if we calculate poverty rates based on adult equivalents (rather than 
based on per capita incomes), which assumes that children need fewer resources and that households 
benefit from considerable economies of scale (see Annex 2).  More importantly, it appears that the poverty 
risk of household size has sharply increased over time.  Based on adult equivalent incomes, the poverty 
rate of households with more than 6 members was nearly 20 percentage points higher in 2002 than of those 
with less than 4 members, up from a difference of less than 10 percentage points in 1989. The differential 
has similarly widened when using per capita incomes. 
Second, the poor have much larger families and thus disproportionately suffer the costs of large 
families.   Using the unsatisfied basic needs index and applying it to the 2002 Census, ‘marginal’ 
households have a TFR of 6.9, compared to a rate of 2.1 for those with satisfied basic needs.  If fertility 
decline reaches the poor, it is likely to have a major impact on poverty reduction as it did elsewhere in 
recent years (e.g. in East Asia and in countries such as Brazil).  
Policies that would further such a development would be a combination of further improvements 
in education and health access for the poor, combined with the availability of low-cost family planning for 
the poor which still appears to be a problem among uneducated women in some rural areas (see INE 2004).
20Box 2: 
Gender and Pro-poor Growth
Compared to other Latin American countries, Bolivia had considerable gender inequality in a 
variety of indicators of well-being, human capital, access to resources, and income earning opportunities. 
For example, as late as 1976, there was a 24 percentage point gap in literacy rates among adults (INE, 
2003).  On many fronts, there has been considerable progress in closing these gaps.  The gap in education 
has closed the fastest.  In 2001, the gap in literacy rates has narrowed to 12 percentage points (with the 
remaining gap being largely due to past discrimination) and gaps in enrolments or progression are now 
limited to a few pockets in more remote municipalities (Anderson and Molina, 2004).  
As shown in the international literature on the subject, the closing of the gender gap in education 
could have important positive effects for growth and human development (e.g. World Bank, 2001; Klasen, 
2002).  This is due to the direct impact of the removal of an artificial distortion that limits the potential of 
women to contribute to economic development and through the indirect impact female education has on 
fertility, mortality, and education of children.   The impact of female education on fertility is well-
documented in Bolivia.  Females with more than 12 years of education have only 1.9 children, compared 
to 6.7 for (the by now very few) females with no education (INE 2003b).  Thus the closing of the gender 
gap will further accelerate the on-going fertility decline with the potential benefits described in Box 1.
As shown in the poverty profile below, it is also noteworthy that female-headed households are 
generally less poor than male-headed households, which is a common finding in Latin America but much 
rarer elsewhere (e.g. Marcoux, 1998).  But one should caution that female-headed households represent a 
very heterogeneous group of households (e.g. single female elderly, single professional women, divorced 
women with or without children, women of migrant workers with or without children, etc) so that it may 
well be that sub-groups are particularly vulnerable to poverty (an issue that deserves further examination). 
Less positive is the record on female opportunities in employment.  Here we find that females have 
much fewer employment opportunities, making up only about a third of formal sector employees, while 
constituting about 50% of informal and self-employment.   In all three sectors they then suffer from 
considerably wage gaps with gender having one of the largest effects on wages (Tannuri-Pianto et al. 
2004); these are also considerably larger than in other Latin American regions (World Bank 2004b).  Also, 
female migrants (who are over-represented among rural to urban migrants) were, prior to 2002, had to 
accept lower wages than the (already depressed) female wages of non-migrant counterparts in urban areas 
(Pianto et al. 2004).   
As shown in Klasen and Lamanna (2004), such discrimination in employment has also been found 
to reduce economic growth due to the distortion such discrimination brings about.  Moreover, it is likely to 
have an adverse effect on poverty reduction as female earnings increase their bargaining power within 
households which has been found to increase investments in education, health, and nutrition of children 
(e.g. Thomas, 1997).  
Lastly, a particularly worrying development is the high incidence of domestic violence in Bolivian 
households, particularly against women.  About 10% of women report being beaten regularly, nearly half 
occasionally, and some 15% of women report occasional incidences of forced sexual relations (INE, 2004). 
These problems are not only well-being issues for the women concerned, but also clearly affect their and 
their children’s ability to contribute to, and profit from economic development opportunities.  
In sum, there has been notable progress in closing gender gaps, particularly in education, but gender 
gaps in employment and pay as well as an unusually high incidence of domestic violence continue to 
generate formidable obstacles for women to contribute to pro-poor growth.  
21Segmentation of the Bolivian Economy and its Impact on Growth and Poverty.  Based on the 
findings above, particularly the large gaps by region, education, and economic sector, it is clear that 
Bolivia’s economy suffers from considerable segmentation, with the poor being largely separated 
from the income-generating and growth processes that tend to favor urban areas as well as resource-
based sectors and modernized agriculture.  In this section we want to discuss various forms of 
segmentation of the economy in some more detail.
(i) Urban-rural and formal-informal divide
The urban-rural divide in Bolivia is particularly strong as was shown by the poverty rates, the depth 
of poverty, and the poverty profile.  The particular mechanisms leading to this large divide relate to 
initial conditions, the dynamics of internal migration, the educational system, and the urban labor 
market. 
The initial conditions relate largely to Bolivia’s population distribution.  Bolivia’s poor are heavily 
concentrated in the rural areas of the altiplano (highlands) and the valles, following Bolivia’s 
historical settlement pattern which focused on these areas.   As these rural areas face difficult 
ecological and climatic conditions for agricultural production, and suffer from the proliferation of 
tiny plots, it is not surprising that poverty rates are higher there.  In addition, Bolivia’s poor have 
been relatively slow to settle in the areas of dynamic economic development in the lowlands, partly 
for climate and health reasons as well as the lack of support networks in these areas.  Thus much 
migration of the poor has involved moving to urban areas in the altiplano and valles as well as 
rural-rural migration within these areas (with particular emphasis on migration related to the coca 
economy) (CODEPO 2002, Pianto et al. 2004). In 1997, 46% of recent rural migrants went to other 
rural areas, presumably due to agricultural employment (esp. coca production) as well as family 
reasons.  By 2002, this share had dropped to 37% (with metropolitan areas taking in a larger share 
of migrants), probably in line with the sharp decline in coca production (Pianto et al. 2004). 
Probably as a result of the economic crisis which is concentrated in the capital cities, return 
migration from them to rural areas (as well as to towns) was between 1997 and 2002 very large, 
making up about 43% of total migration flows between the three regions.  It is important to note 
that female heads of households are over-represented among the rural-urban migrants who 
apparently see better economic opportunities in large cities; at the same time, migrants do not come 
from the poorest areas of the country.  As far as the economic success of migrants are concerned, 
they are mostly able to earn as well as their urban non-migrant counterparts, which then raises the 
question why there is not more migration to equate the large earnings differentials between the 
regions (World Bank 2004b).
18  
In sum, migration currently does not appear to be a reliable mechanism for ensuring quick 
convergence of regional disparities and thus is currently unlikely to contribute much towards 
poverty reduction; this might be an issue for the attention of policy-makers concerned about the 
poverty impact of these regional disparities (see below).
19  Another point of note is that rural-urban 
migrants retain a connection to rural areas to which they can return to, suggesting that the 
segmentation between the regions is not so relevant for this group.  Lastly, not only has economic 
performance of smaller towns has outperformed rural areas and departmental capitals (also in terms 
of pro poor growth), but they are also the beneficiaries of considerable in-migration.  If the past 
performance is any guide, encouraging and supporting migration from rural areas to these towns 
could make a significant contribution to poverty reduction.    
The large educational divide between urban and rural areas amplified this distinction.  In 1976, the 
average years of schooling of the rural adult population stood at a dismal 1.8 years, compared to 6.1 
18  It is important to note that females were not able to benefit economically as much from migration in the 1990s 
although things appear to have improved (Pianto et al. 2004).  
19  This is also borne out by regional growth figures which show that the departments with the lowest poverty rates 
grew the fastest.  It is true, that these departments (i.e. Tarija, Santa Cruz, Pando) were the targets of considerable 
in-migration from poorer departments but this did not enough to reduce disparities (see World Bank 2004b).     
22years in urban areas (INE 2003a).   While investments in rural education have led to better 
outcomes, the differences remain substantial. In 2001, average years of schooling were 9.2 in urban 
and 4.2 in rural areas (INE 2003a).  In addition, analyses of the selectivity of migrants clearly show 
that young, well-educated people speaking Spanish as their main language have a much higher 
likelihood to migrate, thus contributing to a drain of skills from rural areas (Pianto et al. 2004). 
Taken together, these differentials continue to seriously compromise the economic opportunities of 
the poor population.
Third, tight regulation of the formal labor market especially with respect to dismissal protection and 
high costs of formality restrict the access of rural workers and the urban poor, who predominate in 
the informal and self-employed sectors, to income-earning jobs and keep employment in the formal 
labor market below levels that would otherwise be possible.  This is exacerbated by particularly 
high institutional and regulatory barriers to formalization in Bolivia, which sharply reduces the 
incentive for firms to formalize (Kaufmann et al. 2001).  As a result of these two problems, the 
share of informal employment in total employment is among the highest in Latin America (World 
Bank 2004b).  In the 1990s, this was less of a concern since, as a result of other macroeconomic 
reforms, the demand for labor in the formal sector grew nonetheless and the participation rates in 
urban areas increased despite considerable rural-urban migration (Jimenez, Pereira, and Hernany 
2001; Spatz 2004).  However, when the Bolivian economy was hit by external shocks, the tight 
regulation became a more serious problem and reduced the employment opportunities for recent 
arrivals and urban informals, as evidenced by the drop of the formal sector share in urban 
employment to only 50% of employment in 2001 (from 55% in 1997) (Spatz 2004).
20 
While one should not see the urban formal sector as completely closed to rural-urban migrants and 
the urban poor (Pianto et al. 2004; Tannuri-Pianto et al. 2004), the conditions of entry into the 
formal sector are distinctly less favorable for these groups.  In particular, participation equations in 
the formal sector suggest that formal sector employment is particularly difficult to achieve for 
women, for people with a non-Spanish mother tongue, and for the poorly educated (Tannuri-Pianto 
et al. 2004). In addition, selectivity-corrected earnings regressions show that earnings in the formal 
sector are much lower for these same groups suggesting that their ability to enter formal sector 
employment is restricted and happens under worse conditions, both factors that militate against 
urban formal employment as being an important tool for poverty reduction.
A last barrier associated with the formal-informal and rural-urban divide is the very restricted credit 
access  for   self-employed   and  informal   producers.   Despite   the  fact  that   some  of   Bolivia’s 
microfinance institutions have been hailed as models to ensure sustainable credit access, data show 
that the expansion of the portfolio of micro-credit institutions in recent years was associated with a 
contraction in the portfolio of banks, and that it only covers about 10% of the population operating 
in 68 of Bolivia’s 314 municipalities. In rural areas, credit is virtually unobtainable for anyone 
except very large producers, and also in urban areas it is highly restricted.  These problems are 
exacerbated by little movement to restructure state wholesale finance institutions and years of 
inconclusive debate about the possibilities for bringing in informal institutions into the regulatory 
system.
 (ii) The ethnic divide
The urban-rural and formal-informal divide is posing particular problems for the non-Spanish 
populations of Bolivia, who predominate in rural and urban informal sectors.   As shown by 
Andersen, Mercado, and Muriel (2003), there is very large inequality in educational attainments 
between indigenous and non-indigenous populations. Analyses of earnings regressions show that 
lower education levels and lower quality of education account for most of the earnings differences 
in urban and rural areas between Spanish-speaking and indigenous populations. It is important to 
note here that Bolivia has, compared to 13 other Latin American countries included in a 
20   Using different data and a slightly different definition, the formal sector share in urban employment 
dropped to only 32% of employment in 2002 (from 44% in 1997) (Tannuri-Pianto et al. 2004). 
23comparative study, the lowest educational output in public education in terms of language test 
scores of fourth graders, while private educational institutions, which largely serve the Spanish-
speaking urban populations, exhibit much higher scores (Mercado 2003).  The earnings differentials 
are further exacerbated by occupational crowding of indigenous people in sales, agricultural, 
domestic service, and other low earnings occupations in the informal and self-employment sectors 
(Andersen, Mercado and Muriel 2003; Tannuri-Pianto et al. 2004). It is particularly interesting to 
note that this occupational crowding extends with equal force to public sector employment in 
education, health, administration and the like (Anderson, Mercado, and Muriel 2003).  This adds to 
a perception of powerlessness among indigenous groups and their consequent mistrust of the 
government, which until recently had hardly any indigenous representation. It also can explain the 
finding that subjective poverty rates among particularly Quechua-speaking populations are even 
higher than objective poverty rates, presumably due to a felt sense of discrimination and 
powerlessness (World Bank 2004b). This sense is also supported by the finding of particularly low 
social mobility in Bolivia, compared to other Latin American countries, which transmits poverty 
intergenerationally (Andersen 2003).
(iii) Highlands agriculture versus the resource-based economy
These divides would be less important if it had been possible to ensure that productivity in 
highlands agriculture, the mainstay of incomes for many of the poor, had improved in past decades. 
But here, success has proved elusive for the majority of producers.   Qualitative work by 
Tuchschneider (2001) shows that about 90% of highland producers find that their yields have 
deteriorated throughout the 1990s due to worsening climatic conditions (higher temperatures and 
less rain), lack of irrigation, deterioration of soil quality due to overexploitation, lack of land, 
population pressure and lack of modern inputs. Most development projects to support highland 
agriculture (which, interestingly, were concentrated on areas that were better integrated avoiding the 
most remote parts of rural areas) have been deemed unsuccessful by the respondents. Among the 
reasons cited are that they were often not focused on the central problem of declining agricultural 
productivity, did not take a holistic approach that addressed the technical, institutional, and 
economic aspects of the problem, and had little local participation, input, and support.  Those few 
who claim to have benefited particularly value that the projects were focused on achieving 
substantial changes in the production and crop systems, improved access to irrigation and improved 
seed varieties and inputs.   Given the importance of highland agriculture for employment and 
incomes, the failure to improve productivity there is critical.  It is therefore not surprising that there 
was little improvement in rural incomes and poverty which is consistent with the international 
experience that stresses the importance of smallholder agricultural productivity for pro-poor growth 
(e.g. Eastwood and Lipton 2001; Timmer 1997, Klasen 2004). 
In contrast, the most dynamic sectors of the economy have been capital-intensive, export-oriented 
lowlands agriculture, and the resource-based economy involving oil and gas, which are also highly 
capital-intensive with little linkages to the poor.  In this context it is of particular importance to 
stress that the decline of tin mining since the mid-1980s (when the tin price collapsed and the 
government largely abandoned tin mining) took away one form of income from which the poor in 
some of Bolivia’s poorest provinces (particularly in Potosi) had benefited directly and indirectly. 
Linking Growth to Poverty Reduction.  From the analysis above it is not surprising to find high 
levels of inequality and poverty in Bolivia and the relatively poor record in poverty reduction in the 
past 15 years.  If anything, it is somewhat surprising that during the 1990s the poor were able to 
improve their incomes somewhat (from a very low level), including in rural areas, which is true 
even in our sensitivity analysis (although the rate of pro poor growth is very low). It is likely that 
this is driven partly by temporarily favorable weather conditions in agriculture, a recovery from 
particularly poor conditions in the late 1980s, some spill-overs of the growth in the urban formal 
economy to the rural sector (through migration and remittance linkages), and the considerable 
importance of the coca economy which is likely to have had a significant direct and indirect impact 
24on incomes and expenditures in some of the poorest rural areas (such as Chuquisaca, Potosi, and 
Cochabamba). 
Chapter 3: Factors Affecting the Participation of the Poor in Growth
In this chapter we are discussing the impact of initial conditions and policies on the participation of 
the poor in the growth process. We approach this question using two different methods.  First, we 
discuss the role of initial conditions as well as macro and public spending policies on pro-poor 
growth in the past 15 years. We then turn to a formal assessment of the role of policies using a 
dynamic CGE model. While the particular policy simulations used are trying to assess the potential 
for pro-poor policy reforms as we look into the future, we also use these simulations to explain the 
record in the past.
a) Role of Initial Conditions
Bolivia’s initial conditions are generally unfavorable for achieving pro-poor growth.   Bolivia 
suffers from being a large land-locked country with a poorly developed infrastructure that increases 
the remoteness of many of the poor from markets and potential income-earning opportunities. 
Remoteness is also likely to account for the high poverty rates and the few changes in Bolivia’s 
most  remote   and  poorly  developed   highland  and  valley  provinces  (particularly  Potosi   and 
Chuquisaca). For those poor the otherwise positive impact of a liberalizing and integrating economy 
has been found to be much smaller (World Bank, 2004b), a finding similar to Christiaensen, 
Demery and Paternostro for a sample of African countries (Christiaensen, Demery and Paternostro 
2002). Thus whatever growth has taken place has been concentrated in areas with lower poverty, 
while the poorest provinces have experienced below average growth and thus lower poverty 
reduction. The high initial income, land, and ethnic inequality is making poverty-reducing growth 
more difficult to begin with (World Bank 2000, Klasen, 2004) and the high ethnic fractionalization 
is making policy-making for pro-poor growth particularly difficult (e.g. Alesina et al. 2003).  In 
fact, Alesina et al. (2003) cite Bolivia as a particular example of how high ethnic fractionalization 
contributed to poor policy choices and poor quality of public goods in the 1980s. While governance 
clearly improved after the crises and reforms of the mid-1980s, governance indicators remain weak 
compared to Latin American averages in past years (Kaufmann et al. 2003, see also below).  A 
particular governance challenge that was inherited from decades of military rule and coalition 
governments was the rise of patronage relationships and informal procedures and practices in the 
public sector, which in turn supported a growing informalization of the private economy which 
severely restricts its growth potential (Kaufman et al. 2001).   
Lastly, Bolivia is hurt by an economic structure where (with the exception of coca) its most 
lucrative   exportable   products,   particularly   oil,   gas,   some   mining   products,  soya   and   other 
agricultural exportables, are highly capital-intensive and provide few linkages to the poor.  This is 
partly due to nature and geography, but also linked to the inability to develop a dynamic 
smallholder agricultural sector with a great potential for import substitution and exports. As a result 
(as will be shown below in some of the simulations), the potential impact of these export products 
for poverty reduction is small and can even be negative if the Dutch Disease effects dominate the 
otherwise potential beneficial effects of greater exports for poverty reduction.
Box 3: 
Land Distribution and Reform and Pro-poor Growth
As part of the revolutionary government of Victor Paz Estenzorro in the early 1950s, Bolivia enacted 
comprehensive land reform that included a freeing of peasants from labor duties and gave them access to 
25some land.  Despite some short-term success, the reform did not solve the problems of poverty in the 
highlands.  Instead, subdivisions and increasing land pressure led to increasingly smaller plots with little 
modern inputs.  The process largely stopped in the 1970s and due to the emergence of landed estates in the 
lowlands, land inequality in Bolivia is as high as elsewhere in Latin America.  
A new push for agrarian reform came with a new land reform law in 1996.  The focus here is on titling 
although the expectation was that this would lead to restoration of illegally seized land, redistribution of 
public lands, and a renewed push for land reform.  Unfortunately, despite relatively good progress in titling 
(which is nevertheless somewhat  behind schedule by now, see Anderson and Evia, 2003), little 
redistribution has happened as a result of this process, leading to considerably disappointment with land 
reform process and calls for redistributive land reforms.  
Plan Tierra tried to address this by redistributing some public lands in specific projects, but this was widely 
seen as too little, too late, and not broad enough.  Landless movements have sprung up and demands for 
further land reforms are considerable.  At the same time, it is clear that there is not much land available for 
redistribution in the highlands and valles (apart from some public lands) and most land for redistribution 
would be in the lowlands.  At the same time, there might be some scope for land reform by using land 
taxes to bring underutilized private to the market, a subsidy and support program for emerging farmers, 
and further redistribution of public lands.  
Land reform is among the most pressing social and political issues currently under discussion and it is 
clear that political and social stability will depend on successful resolution of these issues.
Source: Urioste (2003), World Bank (2003b).
b) Macro Policies and Pro-poor Spending
Bolivia’s macro and public expenditure approach to poverty reduction can be seen as closely 
following the World Bank’s 1990 model for poverty reduction, which focused on developing a 
growth-oriented strategy and accompany it with investment in human resources and safety nets for 
the poor (World Bank 1990).  Consequently, the growth agenda was largely seen as separate from a 
poverty-reduction agenda in the belief that high growth would ensure sufficient poverty reduction. 
This should be aided by investment in human resources that could then allow for a participation of 
the poor in the growth process.  For those who were left behind, safety nets (such as the Bolivian 
Social Fund and public works programs) should try to address this problem.  While this approach 
worked as long as growth was satisfactory and there were increasing resources to be used for 
expanding social sector spending, it failed to sufficiently promote the productive activities of the 
poor and in addressing the large equity problems permeating Bolivia’s society.
Macro policies and poverty.  As already discussed in Chapter 1, the macro policy agenda was 
mainly one of stabilization and liberalization.  One particular focus of macro policy was to ensure 
low and stable inflation and this has been achieved for the past 20 years (see Table 2).  Given that 
inflation tends to hurt the poor disproportionately, this macro policy is likely to have supported 
poverty reduction.  In addition, the external capital account was liberalized and a friendly foreign 
investment regime was established.  While this allowed a significant increase in foreign direct 
investments throughout the 1990s (Schweickert et al. 2002, World Bank 2004a) the liberalization of 
the external capital account contributed to a further increase in dollarization of the economy which 
severely limited the room to maneuver as far as exchange rate policies are concerned.  There were 
no efforts to combat dollarization, which remains high to this day. While the policy of allowing 
dollarization per se is neither pro- nor anti-poor, it increases the vulnerability of the economy to 
exchange rate shocks (such as the appreciation of the US$, or the sharp devaluation of the Brazilian 
and Argentinian currencies as it occurred in the 1998-2001 period) which can hit the poor more as 
they are unable to shield themselves against such shocks.  Also, it was not possible to use exchange 
rate policies to affect the distribution of income through the use of a real depreciation that would 
26favor poor export and import-competing producers at the expense of wealthier import-consuming 
parts of the population (see Klasen 2004). In addition, strong trade liberalization, while improving 
the allocative efficiency of Bolivia’s economy, further undermined the ability of Bolivia to manage 
its external environment to support poor producers, particularly in an environment of sharply 
fluctuating currency movements with its trading partners.
Fiscal and public expenditure policies.  In the areas of fiscal and public expenditure policies, the 
pro-growth agenda initially dominated policy-making and fiscal policy aimed at low budget 
deficits, which was achieved through tax reforms, prudent expenditure policies, and divestiture 
from loss-making state-owned enterprises.  Tax reforms largely focused on broadening the tax base 
through a value added tax and a transactions tax which together make up some 60% of tax revenues 
in 2002.  A hydrocarbons tax is the only other significant tax generating about 18% of revenues 
(Servicio de Impuestos Internos 2003). As a result, there is no progressivity in the tax system, 
which could be achieved via an income tax on those employed in the formal sector, a serious tax on 
large land-holdings (also to facilitate the sale of underused land by large landowners) or other real 
estate, or significant surcharges for particular items mainly consumed by the non-poor.
21
As long as growth was relatively high in the 1990s, and tax revenues continued to rise, the 
government was able to maintain relatively low budget deficits while at the same time ensuring 
rising expenditures for priority social sectors, such as health and education.  Public expenditures as 
a share of GDP rose sharply in the 1990s, and also public capital expenditures were high by 
international standards (World Bank 2004a); excluding social security, Bolivia now devotes the 
second-highest share of its GDP to public social expenditures in all of Latin America (World Bank 
2004c).  
This was also supported by generous aid flows and complemented by funds made available by 
HIPC I and II, with the latter being channeled entirely to the municipalities to fund priority 
investments, mostly in the social sectors and recently also in infrastructure.
22  Public expenditures in 
health, education, and infrastructure do reach the poor, although to varying degrees (World Bank 
2004a, c).  In particular, while the poor get the same absolute amount of resources as the rich of 
public health expenditures, they get slightly more than that in public primary education (the poorest 
40% capture about 50% of public expenditures on education, presumably due to their larger 
families   and greater  use  of  the  public  system).   Public funds  for  secondary  education  are 
proportional or slightly pro-rich depending on the study (World Bank 2004a, c), largely due to an 
income gradient in enrolment rates, and public spending is sharply pro-rich at the tertiary level.  As 
universities take up 32% of total education spending in 2003, the total effect of education spending 
is proportional, i.e. it reaches the poor about as much as the rich.  Payments from the public pension 
system are strongly pro-rich with the non-poor (who make up 40% of the population in the study) 
collecting 83% of benefits.  As a result of this strong bias, total current public social spending was 
pro-rich, i.e. with 54% of the benefits going to the non-poor and only 46% to the poor.
   Investments in infrastructure at the municipal level are also strongly pro-rich, with the richest 
quintile capturing about twice the absolute amount of subsidies as the poorest fifth in 2000 (World 
Bank 2004a).  This bias has been considerably reduced in the last several years, partly as a result of 
the National Dialogue Law, which required spending from HIPCII resources to be targeted to 
poorer communities (World Bank 2004c).  
Thus public spending presents a mixed picture as far as its poverty and equity impact is concerned. 
While it does reach the poor to some extent, it could do so much more than is currently the case. 
21   Such taxes could, however, face compliance problems in an economy where contraband is widely available 
and tax evasion is considerable (Delgadillo 2000).  In 2003, a few taxes were changed to increase tax revenues but 
they did not seriously affect the progressivity of the tax system. 
22   The World Bank Public Expenditure Report notes that from 1996 to 2001, 75-80% of municipal investment 
was in the social sectors, while in 2002 infrastructure received 34% with social sectors falling to 58% (World Bank 
2004a).  Investments in productive activities were always low and only amounted to 3-6% in the period.  
27Better targeting could be achieved through demanding greater co-payments for health and education 
for the non-poor, as well as boosting access to health services and enrollments in secondary and 
higher education for the poor (through dedicated programs including subsidies).  Moreover, as the 
pension system overwhelmingly benefits the non-poor, limiting the obligations would automatically 
reduce the anti-poor bias of the overall social expenditure system.   
The ability to combine the maintenance of fiscal discipline with rising social expenditures collapsed 
in the late 1990s leading to ever-rising and now unsustainable budget deficits (reaching 9% of GDP 
in 2002).   Three factors largely account for this deterioration (World Bank 2004a).   First, tax 
revenues plummeted in line with the economic slowdown that began in 1999, while expenditures 
continued to rise. Second, a mismanaged pension reform led to much higher than anticipated costs. 
It is now costing 5% of GDP while providing benefits to only 2% of the population, most of them 
non-poor formal sector retirees in urban areas. Third, due to Bolivia’s decentralization program and 
the dedication of HIPC funds to the municipalities, there is little central control or even information 
over expenditures, thereby weakening the ability of the central government to maintain fiscal 
discipline. 
As will be discussed in more detail below, the bargain that maintained economic growth and social 
stability in the 1990s and involved the continuation of an economic model fashioned on the 
Washington Consensus, while ensuring social stability through significant transfers to the social 
sectors, thus became unstuck. It appears that in a situation where inequality, social and ethnic 
tension are high, such a bargain proves unsustainable and extremely fragile.  It has contributed to 
great opposition to the government, calls for populist reforms, and now has thrown the debate about 
the appropriate economic model wide open in the form of the constitutional assembly that will now 
address these issues. A continuation of the current bargain seems not possible, nor is it fiscally 
feasible, and a new approach to economic policy-making is required.  
c) Assessment of the Impact of Shocks and Policies on Pro-poor Growth 
In this section, we make use of the dynamic CGE model described in Annex 2 to assess the impact 
of shocks and policies on Pro-poor growth. While the general approach in this section is to simulate 
forward-looking policies and focuses on the impact of shocks and policies on the ability to reduce 
poverty and inequality, we will also comment on the extent to which they are able to explain past 
performance in growth, inequality, and poverty reduction.  
In its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which was completed in May 2001, the Bolivian 
government formulated ambitious social goals to be achieved over the period 2001–2015 República 
de Bolivia 2001). Among the improvements the PRSP envisages are the following targets with 
respect to income poverty:
 a reduction of the nationwide poverty incidence from 63 % to 41 %;
 a reduction of the urban poverty incidence from 47 % to 32 %;
 a reduction of the rural poverty incidence from 82 % to 52 %.
Success in reaching these and other social targets will to a large extent depend on Bolivia’s ability 
to achieve higher growth. The PRSP calls for average growth in excess of 5 % over the period 
under consideration, compared with an average growth rate of about 4 % in the 1990s. It 
acknowledges that faster growth will require additional structural reforms – in particular a more 
flexible labor market and a more efficient tax system – which enable the country to boost private 
investment, and that only measures specifically tailored to poverty groups, such as investments in 
rural infrastructure, can make growth more pro-poor than in the past. 
So far, the expectations raised in the PRSP have not materialized. During the protracted economic 
slowdown of the last 5 years, both per capita income and the incidence of poverty have stagnated at 
28best.  In a recent revision of the PRSP, the Bolivian economy is projected to grow at an average rate 
of 4.8% between 2006 and 2015 (UDAPE 2003a), which is somewhat below the original 
projections. Moreover, poverty elasticities with respect to overall growth have been revised 
downwards from -0.77 to -0.60 and from -0.54 to -0.26 for urban and rural areas, respectively. 
Given these estimates, which are extremely low in international perspective, and the target growth 
of 4.8%, the headcount index is now only expected to fall to 54 % nationwide and to 45 % and 
75 % in urban and rural areas, respectively, until 2015.
Against the background of these fairly disparate projections, Bolivia’s prospects for achieving pro-
poor growth will be evaluated using the CGE model. In particular, it will be examined how external 
shocks and policy reforms in different areas, ranging from macroeconomic stabilization to poverty-
focused interventions, might affect the trajectory of the Bolivian economy and the evolution of 
poverty. 
While assessing model results, two central characteristics of the model have to be kept in mind. 
First, economic growth is determined by changes in the endowments of the primary factors capital 
and labor as well as the efficiency with which these factors are used. As far as efficiency of using 
factors is concerned, the model assumes an exogenously given rate of TFP growth of 2% per year.
23 
Thus all changes in the simulations will depend on changes in the primary factors capital and labor. 
The major driving forces of labor dynamics are population change, migration, the rate of labor 
productivity growth, and the change in human capital. Of these, the model only takes account of 
population changes, which are kept constant over simulations, and migration. The driving forces for 
capital accumulation are domestic savings and foreign capital inflows as well as relative returns on 
financial (domestic and foreign) and physical assets. Since net capital inflows are exogenously 
given in most simulations
24, differences in growth rates across simulations are the result of changes 
in total domestic savings. Second, the model assumes a full employment situation for all types of 
labor and capital categories in each period of the simulation horizon. Hence, unlike other models for 
Bolivia that analyze short-run issues (e.g. Jemio 2001; Jemio, Wiebelt 2003; Thiele, Wiebelt 2004), 
this model neglects Keynesian multiplier effects that might result from changes in current and 
investment expenditures. With the exception of some taxes and limited intersectoral mobility of 
certain factor categories, there is essentially no difference between the technologically feasible 
production possibility set and the resulting transformation set reflecting market behavior and 
institutional characteristics of the economy. All markets are cleared and overall output is almost 
fixed within individual periods. Taken together, these two model characteristics imply that the 
model cannot be viewed as a short-run projections model and is not intended for that purpose. It is 
better suited to explain medium- to long-term trends and structural responses to changes in external 
conditions and development policy. But the problems facing pro-poor growth are inherently longer-
run problems, and the model thus naturally reflects an emphasis on the long run rather than on the 
short run, on growth rather than stabilization, and on trends rather than cyclical variation.
25  
(i) An Optimistic Baseline Scenario 
A scenario that describes how the Bolivian economy might evolve in the absence of shocks and 
policy changes serves as a benchmark against which all alternative developments will be evaluated. 
23  Two comments are in order.  First, while the assumption of TFP growth of 2% is relatively high (slightly higher 
than was found for the 1990s), for an optimistic baseline scenario it appears realistic.  Second, one may speculate 
that some of the policies proposed will have an impact on TFP growth.  This is possible but there is very sparse 
literature on this subject, both in an international as well as in a Bolivian context.  One might therefore speculate that 
the effects of some policies might be larger because of knock-on effects on TFP growth.  
24  Exceptions are the simulations of declining capital inflows, where capital inflows are changed exogenously, and of 
a devaluation, which changes the domestic currency value of capital inflows.
25  As such, it is also not possible to use the model to track the actual development over the 1990s where short-run 
cyclical variations play a considerable role.  Instead, we can comment on the impact of the various shocks and 
policies on past growth and poverty reduction.  
29In this scenario, the economy exhibits smooth economic growth of about 4.7 percent on average 
over a ten-year period (Table 10)
26, where economic growth is driven by capital accumulation, 
(exogenous) growth of the labor force, and (exogenous) technical progress (2% TFP growth). This 
not only describes an optimistic forward-looking scenario, but is also a good description of the 
record of Bolivia in the 1990s. The growth process is associated with roughly constant domestic 
savings and investment ratios, which implies that the large savings gap is not closed over time. The 
continuing savings gap corresponds to a persistent current account deficit, and both are reflected in 
a fairly stable real exchange rate.
In line with past experience, the structural change projected in the baseline scenario is rather 
moderate. The shares of the broad aggregates “Agriculture”, “Industry” and “Services” in total 
value added barely change over time. More pronounced shifts of resources are taking place within 
these three sectors. Within agriculture, for example, the more productive export-oriented segment 
gains at the expense of the traditional, subsistence-like segment. The same pattern prevails in the 
services sector, where higher productivity growth and a higher income elasticity of demand raise 
the provision of formal relative to informal services.
From a distributional point of view, the baseline scenario suggests that without further policy 
reforms and without external shocks the rise in urban inequality observed over the 1990s will 
continue, and that the rural-urban gap in income levels will widen. In addition, inequality within 
rural areas will also increase. In both urban and rural areas inequality is already at very high levels, 
which is why aggregate growth in Bolivia barely translates into poverty reduction. As the following 
figures indicate, this holds in particular for rural areas. In the course of the simulated 10-year 
period, the national headcount merely declines from 63.6 percent to 55.3 percent. The moderate 
reduction results from a decrease in the urban headcount from 49.7 percent to 38.9 percent, and a 
reduction in rural poverty of only 4 percentage points from 86.9 percent to 82.8 percent. Even under 
this optimistic scenario, Bolivia would just manage to reach the revised national poverty reduction 
target. According to our model, however, poverty reduction in rural areas falls short of the 
reduction predicted in the revised PRSP, while urban poverty declines faster.  
(ii) Accounting for External Shocks
The assumption made in the baseline scenario that no external shocks occur during the simulation 
period is highly unrealistic in the Bolivian context. Most predictably, the agricultural sector is 
recurrently hit by the El Niño phenomenon. Furthermore, a resource-based economy such as 
Bolivia’s has to cope with volatile terms of trade for primary goods. And as the Brazilian crisis 
forcefully demonstrated, Bolivia’s small open economy can hardly avoid being affected by 
instabilities in neighboring countries. In particular, the experience of the Brazilian crisis suggests 
that the high level of foreign capital inflows realized in the mid-1990s should not be taken for 
granted. Doubts about the sustainability of these inflows are reinforced by the fact that most foreign 
direct investment was related to the capitalization process, which was more or less completed at the 
end of the 1990s.
El Niño. Among the external shocks threatening Bolivia, El Niño carries the highest cost in terms 
of short-run agricultural output losses. An El Niño shock of average size may lower GDP growth by 
about one percentage point in the year of its occurrence. Since this is only partly compensated by 
higher growth in subsequent periods, and since El Niño tends to occur every three years, the losses 
add up to significantly lower average growth rates (Table 10). In addition, the fall in agricultural 
exports during El Niño years leads to a deterioration of the current account balance and a real 
depreciation of the Boliviano. The real depreciation, in turn, gives rise to a reallocation of resources 
from inward-oriented sectors such as utilities, construction, and informal services to more outward-
oriented sectors such as intermediate goods and mining.
26   For more detailed information, see Annex 4, which also includes other poverty measures and inequality 
measures.  It should be pointed out that the poverty gap often shows larger results than the poverty headcount, as has 
been the case in the past.  
30The direct distributional consequence of El Niño is that smallholders and agricultural workers suffer 
income losses. The same is true for employers, who obtain a significant share of their capital 
income from investments undertaken in modern agriculture. The negative impact on these three 
household groups is somewhat dampened by a slight increase in domestic agricultural prices as a 
result of supply shortages.
27 The price increases are not strong enough, however, to show up in 
lower real incomes for urban food consumers. In urban areas, the only major effect of El Niño on 
household incomes runs via the real devaluation, which makes the providers of non-traded informal 
services worse off. By contrast, the overall income position of non-agricultural workers and 
employees is hardly affected as their gains in tradable sectors tend to offset their losses in non-
tradable sectors. The decline of urban informal income results in a quite considerable increase in the 
urban poverty incidence. In some periods, the urban headcount increases by more than 1.5 
percentage points compared to the baseline scenario. The rise in urban poverty is comparable to that 
in rural areas where the headcount is on average about one percentage point higher than in the base 
run. Inequality rises somewhat within urban areas, and quite considerably in rural areas, which is 
mainly due to the fact that the losses of the employers in modern agriculture are less pronounced 
than those for rural workers and smallholders.
Terms-of-Trade Shock.  Terms of Trade shocks, such as the 10-percent decrease in world market 
prices for agricultural and mineral products considered here, differ from supply shocks, such as El 
Niño, in one main respect: they do not impair production capacities and thus do not lead to major 
output losses as long as the economy operates at or near full employment.
28 Rather, the direct effect 
of the Terms of Trade shock is to reduce relative output prices and the incomes earned in the 
affected sectors, which induces a shift of production towards non-affected sectors. Further 
economy-wide repercussions are caused by the fall in agricultural prices, which lowers intermediate 
input costs for processed agricultural products and thereby boosts output in the consumer goods 
sector, and – analogous to the case of El Niño – by the real devaluation that follows the widening of 
the current account deficit.
The negative income effect of the Terms of Trade shock is most strongly felt by agricultural 
workers as the export-oriented modern agricultural sector, where they earn their living, experiences 
a marked decline. For smallholders, who mainly serve the domestic market, the drop in real income 
levels is much less severe. For the urban household groups, various factors work in opposite 
directions, and they appear to cancel out. Urban informals, for instance, benefit from lower food 
prices, while the real devaluation and an increase in rural-urban migration exert downward pressure 
on their real income. Therefore, urban poverty remains virtually constant, whereas poverty in rural 
areas increases slightly. In rural areas, the income distribution worsens to some extent because of 
the income losses experienced by the workers in modern agriculture.
Declining Capital Inflows.  If foreign direct investment (FDI) falls by almost a third, as has been 
the case in Bolivia in the year 2000, this causes only about half the immediate output losses of El 
Niño, but the impact turns out to be much more persistent.
29 Even after ten years, growth has not 
fully recovered. The fall in FDI lowers the domestic investment ratio by about 2.5 percentage 
points, which narrows the savings gap because domestic savings hardly change. Correspondingly, 
the current account deficit improves, with rising exports and falling imports. The losses incurred at 
the macro level are spread over all sectors using formal capital, and over those producing capital 
goods. Since traditional agriculture and informal services lack access to formal capital, smallholders 
27   It is assumed that domestic agricultural prices are to a large extent determined by world market conditions 
so that there is only limited scope for independent domestic price movements. 
28   The assumption of full employment, which does not rule out the existence of underemployment, seems to 
be justified at least in non-recession years where open unemployment tends to be very low. But even shocks which 
mainly affect agriculture are unlikely to drive up open unemployment as the rural population cannot fall back on a 
social safety net. 
29   Since a dramatic fall in FDI can be expected to lead to temporary open unemployment on a significant 
scale, the true short-run losses probably exceed those reported here. 
31and urban informals are the only household groups, which do not immediately suffer from the 
shock. A real devaluation of the Boliviano, however, indirectly hurts the urban informals, while it 
benefits modern agriculture to such an extent that the sector’s loss of FDI is overcompensated. 
Temporarily, smallholders and agricultural workers gain slightly from the shock, but lose somewhat 
in the medium run as a result of lower economic growth. This drives the evolution of the rural 
poverty incidence, which decreases slightly in the shock period, but increases by up to 0.7 
percentage points afterwards. Over the entire simulation period, the rural income distribution 
improves quite considerably. By contrast, all urban households are negatively affected by the 
decrease in FDI. During adjustment to the shock, the urban headcount increases by almost two 
percentage points compared to the baseline scenario. The urban income distribution worsens 
somewhat, which is mainly due to the very pronounced decrease in urban informal income.
A similar drop in portfolio investment, which was the main consequence of the Brazilian crisis, 
strongly reinforces the negative short-run impact of the fall in FDI. During the initial year, both 
shocks combined drive the growth rate of real GDP down by about 1.5 percentage points. Since 
lower portfolio investment reduces growth only temporarily, the medium-run impact is dominated 
by the reduction of FDI. Average growth over the whole simulation period is about 0.3 percentage 
points lower than in the baseline scenario.  The medium-run poverty outcome for the combined 
shocks is very similar to the FDI shock alone. In the short run, however, the impact on urban 
poverty is much stronger, with an increase of the urban headcount by 3 percentage points during the 
first period.
All in all, a realistic baseline scenario for Bolivia’s medium-run development prospects would have 
to acknowledge that under the current policy framework average growth rates are unlikely to lie 
markedly above 4 percent. Compared to the optimistic scenario, this implies worse prospects for 
poverty reduction.
Apart from helping to arrive at a realistic assessment of Bolivia’s medium-run development 
prospects, the simulations discussed above may also contribute to explain the past evolution of the 
economy.
30 Over the 1990s, the foreign investment boom triggered by the capitalization process has 
in all likelihood been a key factor behind the comparably high growth rates until 1998. And 
according to our results, the poverty impact of foreign-investment-driven growth tends to be biased 
in favor of urban households, but does not completely bypass the rural economy. Compared to this 
effect, agricultural shocks have only played a minor role between 1990 and 1998. The only major 
exception is a severe El Niño, which in combination with declining prices for some primary 
products led to negative per capita income growth in 1992 and thus may have worsened the overall 
poverty outcome for rural areas in the early 1990s (as found above). A favorable external 
environment for agricultural production may at least partly explain the result obtained in Chapter 2 
that the rural poor fared exceptionally well over the period 1994 to 1998. The recession that started 
in 1999 has in all likelihood hit urban households harder than rural households because the sharp 
decline in foreign capital inflows in the year 2000 has clearly dominated the agricultural shocks (El 
Niño, deterioration of terms of trade), which set in a year earlier. 
(iii) Macro policies
One of Bolivia’s biggest achievements since the beginning of reforms in 1985 has been the 
containment of inflation by means of prudent monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies.
31 It might 
be argued that now, with an internal equilibrium that is firmly established, the exchange rate could 
be used to improve the external competitiveness of the Bolivian economy and affect its income 
30   With a grain of salt, the simulation results may be used for the explanation of past developments because 
the baseline scenario considered here is basically an extrapolation of the situation prevailing in the 1990s before the 
recent recession. 
31    Since inflation is unlikely to be among the major policy issues in the foreseeable future, measures aimed at 
containing inflation will not be analyzed here. 
32distribution, given that the Boliviano has always been quite strong (Schweickert et al. 2003). The 
macroeconomic policy instruments are also still needed to bring about the real devaluations 
required in the face of negative external shocks.
Nominal Devaluation. A higher yearly devaluation of the Boliviano within the crawling peg 
regime causes an almost complete exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices, which will rise by 
nearly the same amount as the Boliviano is devalued as Bolivia’s ability to respond to higher import 
prices with competitive import-substituting domestic production is quite limited.
32 The resulting real 
devaluation is therefore too small to provide the incentives for a significant reallocation of 
resources, and the minor real adjustment that occurs has no discernible effect on aggregate 
economic performance. Real effects, however, originate from the financial side of the economy, 
which is strongly and directly affected by the devaluation. This is because in the highly dollarized 
Bolivian economy the value of most assets and liabilities is indexed to the Dollar exchange rate. As 
a consequence, the net wealth position of net creditors in the financial system improves, while that 
of net debtors worsens. Since the economy as a whole – in particular the government – is a strong 
net foreign debtor, the overall wealth effect of the devaluation is negative. The deterioration of the 
domestic wealth position leads to a drop in aggregate real investment and a fall in the growth rate, 
which accelerates over time due to a compound interest effect. Among the household groups, the 
two richest, employers and employees are the only major actors on financial markets. Both are net 
creditors and thus benefit from higher net wealth and interest income, i.e. the revaluation of assets 
caused by the devaluation tends to reinforce existing wealth disparities. All other household groups 
are adversely affected by the negative growth effect. Unskilled workers and urban informals are 
most severely hurt because many of them are employed in the construction sector where production 
growth is lower because of lower real investment demand. As a consequence, urban inequality 
increases and urban poverty rises somewhat more than rural poverty.  Thus such a policy would be 
counter-productive and poverty-increasing in the current environment of near complete pass-
through to domestic prices, high dollarization, and large foreign debt.  Conversely, tackling any of 
these three constraints successfully could change the assessment of such a policy considerably.  
32   During recessions such as the current one, when capacities are underutilized, the pass-through will of 
course be lower, but the question here is whether the exchange rate can contribute to improve Bolivia’s 
competitiveness in the medium run.










Baseline Scenario 4.7 55.3 38.9 82.8
Terms-of-Trade Shock 4.7 55.6 39.1 83.3
El Niño 4.4 56.3 39.7 84.1
Declining Capital Inflows 4.4 56.3 40.3 83.3
Nominal Devaluation 4.5 56.7 40.4 83.9
Real Devaluation (restrictive monetary 
policy)
4.7 54.8 38.1 82.9
Labor Market Reform 5.0 54.4 37.4 82.8
Tax Reform (revenue-neutral) 5.0 53.9 37.0 82.4
Gas Projects (higher government 
consumption)
5.1 54.9 37.8 83.8
Gas Projects (constant government 
consumption)
5.3 53.8 36.1 83.7
Gas Projects (constant government 
consumption) plus Labor Market 
Reform plus Tax Reform
5.8 52.0 33.5 83.0
Improved Access to Credit for 
Smallholders
4.7 55.2 38.8 82.8
Investment in Rural Infrastructure (high 
productivity effect)
4.8 55.0 38.6 82.4
Investment in Rural Infrastructure (low 
productivity effect)
4.8 55.1 38.7 82.5
Industrial Policy (modern agriculture) 4.7 55.7 39.6 82.7
Industrial Policy (consumer goods) 4.6 54.9 38.3 82.8
Transfer Program (lower government 
consumption)
4.7 53.8 37.9 80.5
Transfer Program (lower public 
investment)
4.5 54.6 38.9 81.1
Gas Projects plus Transfer Program 5.1 53.5 37.1 81.0
35aRatio at the end of the 10-year simulation period.  Please note that the initial poverty 
headcounts are: 63.6% national, 49.7% urban, and 86.9% rural.
Source: Own calculations based on the CGE model.  
Real Devaluation.  A real devaluation can be achieved if the Central Bank conducts a restrictive 
monetary policy. By constraining the opportunities of private banks to supply credit, such a policy 
temporarily lowers aggregate real investment demand and thereby exerts downward pressure on the 
domestic price level. The drop in real investment, in turn, causes a temporary economic slowdown. 
Specifically, it has a contractionary impact on capital-intensive sectors and on the sectors providing 
capital goods. This effect dominates the restructuring of production resulting from the real 
devaluation, which brings about an improvement of the current account. Household incomes are 
only moderately affected by these adjustments. While the investment slowdown makes non-
agricultural workers, in particular construction workers, slightly less well off, the real depreciation 
entails minor losses for urban informals and minor gains for rural households. After the short-run 
adjustments, the economy soon shifts back to the old growth path, and household incomes evolve 
largely as in the base run. As construction output rebounds rather strongly, non-agricultural workers 
and urban informals even realize small medium-run gains so that urban poverty declines somewhat 
towards the end of the simulation period. All in all, the negative impact on poor households often 
attributed to real devaluations is unlikely to occur in Bolivia. 
(iv) Structural reforms 
By Latin American standards, Bolivia has also made remarkable progress in the area of structural 
reforms (see, e.g., Lora 2001). The main exception is labor market reform, where Bolivia lags 
behind most other Latin American countries. Among the labor market distortions that still prevail, 
the segmentation of the urban labor market into formal and informal parts stands out. The tax 
system is another area where further reforms may be warranted. In particular, the question arises of 
whether the income tax, which hitherto has been of only marginal importance, should become a 
major source of government revenues.
Labor Market Reform. If the government makes it easier for urban informals to be employed as 
unskilled workers in the formal labor market, e.g. by lowering the costs of dismissal or by granting 
more options for temporary work, the obvious direct effect is that average real wages go down for 
unskilled workers and up for urban informals. Better earning opportunities in the urban informal 
sector, in turn, induce rural-urban migration on a significant scale, which moderately increases the 
incomes of those who stay in traditional agriculture. At the macro level, the efficiency gains 
achieved by reducing labor market segmentation – the wage differential between informal labor and 
unskilled labor is roughly halved – translate into average economic growth rates which are more 
than 0.3 percentage points higher than in the base run. 
On balance, these developments cause negligible distributional shifts in urban areas because higher 
incomes for informals are offset by lower incomes for unskilled workers. Nonetheless, urban 
poverty decreases because of higher growth, but it takes some periods for the positive growth effect 
to materialize. The rural income distribution changes somewhat in favor of poorer groups due to the 
gains experienced by smallholders. This change and a slight increase in rural growth do not show 
up in the poverty headcount, but the rural poverty gap falls moderately (see Annex 2).
Tax Reform.  A rise in income taxes for all household groups except smallholders and urban 
informals directly forces the two richest household groups, employers and employees, to consume 
and save less. For worker households the impact on disposable income is not strong enough to alter 
consumption and savings significantly.
33 The main indirect effect runs via a tax-induced fall in 
aggregate private consumption, which lowers the prices received by smallholders and urban 
33   The impact of the tax increase on aggregate poverty and income distribution cannot be calculated because 
the household survey on which the distributional measures are based does not contain information on income tax 
payments.
36informals und thus worsens their real income position. The growth effect of the tax increase 
depends on how the receipts are allocated between consumption and investment. Under the 
assumption that the government broadly retains the original structure of expenditures, it is likely to 
be moderately contractionary in the medium run as the rise in public investment does not suffice to 
fully offset the fall in private investment. This in turn would have a negative impact on the factor 
incomes of all household groups.
If higher income taxes are combined with lower indirect taxes so as to arrive at a revenue-neutral 
tax reform, the economy-wide outcome is different.
34 Lower indirect tax rates cause an expansion of 
capital-intensive industries (oil and gas, mining, intermediate goods), where the indirect tax burden 
is highest, and thus boost investment and growth. Overall, given the current tax structure, a 
revenue-neutral tax reform can be expected to improve Bolivia’s growth performance. As for 
household incomes, the decrease in indirect taxes raises private consumption expenditures, thereby 
offsetting the negative demand effect that higher income taxes have on smallholders and urban 
informals. The main beneficiaries of the reform are non-agricultural workers, many of whom work 
in the mining and the intermediate goods sector, as well as in construction, which benefits from 
higher investment demand. The expansion of the construction sector additionally favors urban 
informals so that on balance their incomes are also significantly higher than in the base run. The 
gains of these two groups reduce the urban headcount ratio by up to 2 percentage points, and even 
rural poverty falls a little due to the growth effect. 
(v) Gas Projects
Perhaps more than any macroeconomic and structural policy reform, the development of the natural 
gas sector promises to change the medium-run growth path of the Bolivian economy. Two large 
export-oriented hydrocarbon projects with Brazil and Argentina are already being implemented and 
another project involving the export of liquefied natural gas to North America has entered the 
planning stage but is currently on hold (IMF 2004). Taken together, these projects could roughly 
double the share of oil and gas in total domestic production from 5 to 10 percent within a decade, 
oil and gas could finally account for as much as 50 percent of total exports. Since the sector is an 
“enclave” in the sense that it uses negligible domestic inputs and generates little employment, its 
main link to the economy is through the fiscal accounts via increased revenues from taxes, and 
through its effects on the balance of payments – the current account improves and the exchange rate 
appreciates in real terms. 
The natural gas boom translates into markedly higher economic growth. In 2008 and 2009, when 
the liquefied natural gas project is assumed to reach full capacity, the growth rate is likely to 
approach 6 percent.
35  These average gains are likely to be somewhat underestimated because the 
upfront investment necessary to construct and develop large gas projects is not taken into account.
36 
The size of the growth effect will also depend on how the government uses its additional revenues. 
If the receipts are channeled into consumption, the average gains over the simulation period will 
only be about two thirds as large as if consumption growth is left constant and the resources are 
instead used to prop up public savings.  Choosing the latter option would increase the overall 
domestic savings ratio by up to 3 percentage points compared to the base run, a remarkable 
improvement which macroeconomic and structural reforms are unlikely to achieve. 
The real appreciation of the Boliviano, which in the peak years of the resource boom might reach 8 
to 9 percent, leads to a contraction of export-oriented sectors such as modern agriculture, mining, 
34   To arrive at a revenue-neutral tax reform, tax rates in those sectors that are mainly subject to indirect taxes have to 
be lowered by roughly 20 percent.
35   The growth results obtained here come quite close to the projections reported in IMF (2004).
36   While most of the inputs, in particular capital goods, will need to be imported, some domestic activities 
such as construction and business services might benefit during the early phases of the gas projects.  The pipeline 
construction to Brazil is estimated to have contributed some 1.5% of GDP in 1996-97.
37and consumer goods, and an expansion of nontradables, in particular construction. This is the well-
known Dutch Disease effect of resource booms, which, however, turns out to be rather moderate 
except for the two peak years. By keeping consumption growth constant, the government can 
slightly dampen the Dutch Disease effect. As a further economy-wide repercussion, lower consumer 
goods production reduces intermediate demand for agricultural raw materials so that modern 
agricultural activities contract even more, while smallholders suffer from declining prices as they 
can hardly adjust supply. A restructuring of final demand away from private consumption 
reinforces the pressure on smallholders’ prices and also hurts urban informals. Together with the 
fact that rural-urban migration rises considerably, this explains that urban informals are slightly 
worse off as a result of the gas projects even though they benefit from the real appreciation and the 
expansion of the construction sector. Overall, rural areas, i.e. smallholders as well as agricultural 
workers, suffer significant income losses, in particular in the two peak years. In urban areas, both 
unskilled and skilled workers gain, with the gain of skilled workers, who are for the most part 
employed in the public sector, being much more pronounced if government consumption expands.
These changes in relative factor prices induce major distributional and poverty changes. From a 
national perspective, inequality increases substantially, which is due to both rising inequality 
between and within urban and rural areas. In the scenario with higher government consumption, the 
national Gini coefficient increases by about one percentage point. The results regarding the 
evolution of poverty during the gas boom are disappointing. Despite considerably higher growth 
rates, the decrease in nation-wide poverty is only moderate compared to the baseline scenario. More 
remarkably,   rural   poverty   even   increases   substantially,   with   a   rural   headcount   that  
falls by up to one percentage point. The rural poverty gap ratio, which during the second half of the 
simulation period is about 2.5 points higher than in the baseline scenario, illustrates that many of 
those who were already poor incur income losses.
A somewhat more favorable outcome could be expected if the government refrained from raising 
consumption expenditures. In this case, the headcount would be significantly lower in urban areas, 
but rural households would hardly benefit and thus would remain markedly worse off than without 
the gas projects. In addition, the rise in inequality would be somewhat less severe due to the 
dampened Dutch Disease effect, with an increase in the Gini coefficient of about 0.5 percentage 
points.
A fairly large medium-term boost for the Bolivian economy might become possible if the gas 
projects were combined with the structural reforms discussed above. Such a policy package could 
raise average economic growth by more than 1 percentage point and lower the national headcount 
by more than 3 percentage points. The gains would, however, exclusively accrue to urban 
households. They would benefit from a substantial drop in the poverty rate by more than 5 
percentage points compared to the base run, while rural poverty would even rise a little.  Clearly, 
such a strategy maximizes growth, but not pro-poor growth.   
(vi) Targeted interventions in favor of the poor
The low poverty elasticities with respect to growth point to the problem that many of Bolivia’s poor 
are not well integrated into the economy and are additionally too poor to be lifted above the poverty 
line as a result of moderate economic growth. Among the policies which might help increase the 
productivity of the poor, particularly in rural areas where poverty is most persistent, improved 
access to credit for smallholders and investment in public goods such as rural infrastructure and 
agricultural research figure prominently (Thiele 2003). More direct ways of raising incomes of poor 
households could involve the subsidization of activities where many of the poor are employed 
(Klasen 2004), or the implementation of traditional transfer programs.
Improved Access to Credit for Smallholders.   Efforts to improve credit availability for 
smallholders, e.g. by making land tenure more secure, are likely to raise investment in traditional 
agriculture significantly, albeit from a very low base. The impact tends to decelerate over time, but 
38even after 10 years real investment could still exceed the base-run level by almost 50 percent. 
However, since the contribution of capital to sectoral value added is very small (and is assumed to 
have no impact on TFP growth), the investment boom only raises output by about 1 percent in the 
short run and by about 3 percent in the medium run. This supply response is too moderate to induce 
major adjustments in the rest of the economy. Aggregate investment rises slightly and average 
economic growth is less than 0.05 percentage points higher than in the base run. Smallholders’ real 
income position improves somewhat as a result of the output expansion, but this does not show up 
in the rural headcount, and even the poverty gap falls only marginally. Hence, the loosening of 
smallholders’ credit restrictions must be regarded as largely ineffective in the medium term, at least 
without further complementary measures.  In the long term, such a policy is likely to be more 
beneficial as it allows the build-up of a capital stock and thus progressively raise the contribution of 
capital to value added.  
Investment in Rural Infrastructure.  Specific investments in public goods – e.g. the development 
of more productive crop varieties or the construction of rural roads – might constitute one such 
complementary measure. However, even if public investments are tailored to smallholders’ needs, 
its impact is constrained by the difficult natural conditions prevailing in the Bolivian highlands.
37 
Here   we   consider   two   different   scenarios:   a   fairly   optimistic   one   where   we   assume   that 
smallholder’s average output is raised by about 12 percent compared to the base run, and a more 
pessimistic one where the rise in output is only half that size. In both cases, the expansion of 
smallholder agriculture comes partly at the expense of modern agriculture so that smallholders 
realize income gains, whereas agricultural workers experience a less pronounced decline in wages. 
Although there is a countervailing force in the form of a small price decrease, smallholders benefit 
to such an extent that fewer of them migrate to urban areas. Together with a small real appreciation, 
this slightly improves the income position of urban informals. 
Despite considerably higher income gains in rural areas, reductions in the urban and rural headcount 
are roughly equal. The difference between the two regions manifests itself in a significantly higher 
fall of the rural poverty gap (see Annex 4), which again reveals that many smallholders are far 
below the poverty line. In addition, inequality within rural areas decreases slightly. As for a 
comparison between the optimistic and the pessimistic scenario, all the mechanisms described 
above are more pronounced with stronger productivity effects of public investment. While this does 
hardly show up in economic growth rates and the poverty incidence, it is clearly reflected in the 
rural poverty gap, which goes down by more than 1 percentage point in the optimistic scenario as 
compared to 0.5 percentage points in the pessimistic scenario.   
Industrial Policy. While the measures just mentioned aim at augmenting the asset base of poor 
households, a pro-poor industrial policy instead aims at raising the returns on existing assets, in 
particular on unskilled labor. One option in this area would be to support the development of 
modern agriculture.  If the government, for instance, granted a 20 percent export subsidy, the sector 
would become markedly more important, particularly in terms of its share in total exports, which 
might increase from 15 to 25 percent. The expansion of modern agriculture is fuelled by rural 
migrants who are attracted by steeply increasing agricultural wages, and by a reallocation of capital. 
It is thus associated with lower output growth in traditional agriculture and in the capital-intensive 
sectors. The policy-induced structural change leads to an improvement of the current account, a 
small real appreciation of the Boliviano, and minor efficiency losses for the economy. With respect 
to household incomes, the out-migration of smallholders to some extent benefits those who stay in 
traditional agriculture. The migration effect on smallholders’ incomes remains limited because the 
workforce required in modern agriculture is very small compared to the number of smallholders. 
Lower production growth in capital-intensive sectors implies lower real incomes for workers and 
urban informals, which translates into moderately higher urban poverty over the whole simulation 
period. The rural headcount falls by almost one percentage point in the first period, but the 
37   Since little is known about the likely productivity effects of public investment in Bolivia’s highland 
agriculture, the results presented here should be regarded as very tentative.
39deviation from the base run gradually disappears as the gains of agricultural workers become 
smaller over time.
An alternative option would be to support agriculture-based industrialization rather than primary 
agricultural activities. Subsidizing the consumer goods industry would entail stronger economy-
wide adjustments than subsidizing modern agriculture and, as a consequence, efficiency losses 
would be higher. Most importantly, the Boliviano would appreciate considerably, and intermediate 
demand for agricultural raw materials would go up. The backward linkage to agriculture boosts the 
production of both agricultural sectors, but for modern agriculture this effect is overcompensated by 
the loss of competitiveness caused by the real appreciation. This implies that smallholders receive 
higher real incomes, whereas agricultural workers incur minor losses. The real appreciation 
improves the income situation of urban informals. Non-agricultural workers benefit from the 
expansion of the consumer goods industry, but as this expansion largely occurs at the expense of 
other sectors where they mainly work, their overall income position is not improved. Nonetheless, 
urban poverty declines substantially due to the gains realized by urban informals. The reduction in 
the rural headcount again tends to disappear over time, in this case because smallholders mainly 
benefit in the short run.
Transfer Programs.   Transfer payments constitute the most direct means of enhancing the real 
income position of the poor. Here we assume that the government expands existing transfer 
programs so that gross incomes of the poor household groups are raised every year by roughly five 
percent compared to the base run. Thus these programs assume that it is possible to target such an 
enhancement of transfers to the poor, but that among the poor, the transfers are distributed in line 
with the receipts of transfers in 1999, i.e. no further improvement in targeting is assumed.  As 
shown above, transfer and social expenditures are not particularly well-targeted, that is the effects 
could be more beneficial to the poor than shown here through better targeting (see also World Bank 
2004a).  Whether the impact of such programs goes beyond the direct beneficiaries largely depends 
on how the government finances the outlays. If it substitutes transfer payments for consumption 
expenditures, economy-wide repercussions are negligible and average growth is not affected. The 
only significant change is the fall in consumption expenditures itself, which leads to somewhat 
lower real incomes for public employees. As a consequence of the transfers that mainly benefit 
smallholders and urban informals, both urban and rural poverty falls markedly. The evolution of 
inequality appears to be less favorable. While the nation-wide Gini coefficient falls somewhat as the 
income change is stronger in rural than in urban areas, urban inequality remains constant and rural 
inequality even widens. These surprising regional results can be explained by the fact that the 
transfers tend to reach richer rather than poorer segments of the smallholders and urban informals.
Financing transfer programs through cuts in investment spending has a much stronger impact on the 
economy as it lowers aggregate investment and saving ratios by over one percentage point and 
thereby leads to reduced economic growth. The investment slowdown is most strongly felt in the 
construction sector, which implies that factor incomes of workers and urban informals decline. For 
urban informals, the decline is cushioned by a restructuring of final demand towards private 
consumption. The shift in final demand equally raises smallholders’ factor incomes so that they 
enjoy direct and indirect benefits. Overall, the secondary effects via the fall in investment fully 
offset the transfer-induced urban poverty reduction, whereas rural poverty alleviation remains 
sizeable.
As transfer programs have the biggest impact on reducing rural poverty, the combination with a 
natural gas project might yield a favorable scenario.  We show such a combined scenario in Table 
10 and it indeed is able to deliver higher growth and lower poverty in urban and rural areas.  If such 
a policy package was also combined with labor market and tax reform as well as improvements in 
the targeting of transfers among the poor, the poverty impact could be substantial and conceivably 
allow the government to reach its PRSP targets also in rural areas.  
40To summarize the findings from the policy simulations, a few points are worth noting.  Regarding 
an explanation of the impact of shocks and policies on pro-poor growth in the past, the following 
conclusions are warranted.  First, one can nicely see how the evolution of poverty and growth in 
urban areas has varied with foreign capital inflows. Rural development has been more dependent on 
climatic conditions, and the lack of private and public capital. The failure to implement labor 
market reforms appears to have held back growth and urban poverty reduction. A deregulation of 
the urban labor market would also have had a positive if limited impact on rural incomes by 
providing an incentive for additional rural-urban migration.
38
Looking forward, one can draw conclusions about the policy options for pro-poor growth as well as 
the constraints of Bolivia’s economy that the model analysis has served to highlight.  Turning to the 
former issue, the main conclusion to be drawn from the model analysis is that, currently, the 
opportunities for achieving pro-poor growth are much better in urban than in rural areas. Given the 
available policy choices, Bolivia could clearly exceed the targets for urban poverty reduction set in 
the revised PRSP. Rural poverty reduction, by contrast, risks falling short of the targets due to a 
combination   of   recurrent   external   shocks   and   limited   policy   options.   In   particular,   the 
implementation of gas projects is likely to bypass rural areas and significantly increase inequality. 
Improvements in access to credit and rural infrastructure have a positive but fairly small effect on 
poverty (particularly on the poverty gap).  Only a coordinated policy package involving the gas 
project, labor market and tax reforms, and targeted transfer programs and interventions would allow 
Bolivia to achieve higher pro-poor growth and allow significant poverty reduction, also in rural 
areas.   
Turning to the latter issue, the analysis has clearly shown up significant structural weaknesses of 
Bolivia’s economy that also need to be addressed in order to accelerate pro-poor growth. A critical 
weakness is Bolivia’s low domestic savings rate, which is contributes to Bolivia’s reliance on 
foreign capital inflows, the high degree of dollarisation, its high foreign debt, its vulnerability to 
external shocks, and its inability to manage its external trade and monetary environment to support 
pro-poor growth.  A related second weakness is Bolivia’s high dependence on natural resources 
which have few linkages to the poor, but can have significant anti-poor effects.  Third, Bolivia’ 
economy exhibits such a great degree of dualism that well-managed policies to generate higher 
growth do not reach the poor in rural areas or have little impact on their poverty.  Lastly, Bolivia’s 
high initial inequality militates against success in poverty reduction, particularly in rural areas. 
While the policy packages discussed above can help with pro-poor growth, only success in tackling 
these four deep-seated issues will enable Bolivia to enter a sustainable path towards higher growth 
and poverty reduction.    
d) Institutions, Political Economy, and Pro-poor Growth
This section will discuss selected institutional aspects of policy-making in Bolivia as they relate to 
pro-poor growth.  We will focus particularly on an assessment of institutional weaknesses, then 
discuss the impact of decentralization on policy-making, and lastly consider the PRSP and National 
Dialogue process and its impact on policy-making for pro-poor growth.  
(i) Governance weaknesses and their link to poverty and inequality
Based on the most comprehensive source of governance indicators (Kaufman et al. 2003), Table 11 
shows the evolution of composite indicators of governance in the Bolivian case.  The indicators are 
scaled so that they have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 for all countries included in the 
sample.  The first group summarizes indicators of the political process, civil and political rights. 
The   political   instability   indicator   measures   the   likelihood   of   government   overthrow   or 
destabilization, the third cluster summarizes measures of public service provision, competence and 
quality of the bureaucracy and the last one summarizes the incidence of market-unfriendly policies. 
38   There are indications that the model underestimates the response of migration to changes in wage 
differentials. Additional empirical research is needed to see whether the modeling of migration assumes the right 
amount of adjustment compared to actual migration patterns in Bolivia.  
41It is notable that in all four governance measures Bolivia exhibits a downward trend in the last few 
years, ending up close to or below the average for all countries.
39  This is particularly the case for 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality.  As most of these measures are based on survey-
based evidence, it appears that the trust in the policy-making apparatus and the state bureaucracy 
has weakened already well before the recent protests over tax reform and gas exports.
More detailed investigations of the role of institutions in Bolivia by Kaufman et al (2002) yield 
further important insights.  In particular, business surveys reveal that corruption and the lack of the 
rule of law stand out as particular constraints in Bolivia, while issues of macro management and 
financing are not seen as a problem at all.  Corruption, bribery, and a weak judiciary are also named 
as significant barriers preventing sales growth.  This suggests that the structural reforms of the 
1990s were having positive effects in their areas of focus but did not tackle the more deep-seated 
problems of corruption and a weak judiciary.  As far as causes of corruption and low government 
effectiveness is concerned the results suggest that lack of transparency and voice of citizens appear 
to be the most important reasons, according to surveys of public officials.  Also here, much work 
remains to be done.
These institutional weaknesses not only retard economic growth by preventing effective policy-
making (Rodrik, 2003), but they also are implicated in sustaining high inequality.  A study by 
Chong and Gradstein (2004) show that indicators of institutional weakness are strongly associated 
with inequality in Latin America.   The causality is bi-directional with the causal link from 
inequality to institutions being somewhat stronger than the reverse one.  The discussion suggests 
that also here there are two sets of policy issues emerging.  On the one hand, there is clear need to 
tackle the institutional weaknesses in Bolivia, particularly corruption, lack of a reliable judiciary, 
and lack of transparency and voice in the public sector.  On the other hand, it is clear that such 
reforms will be more difficult in an environment of high inequality that sustains these institutional 
problems, which provides a further case to address these inequalities.   
Table 11: Trends in Governance Indicators over Time
1996 1998 2000 2002
Voice and Accountability 0.10 0.35 0.23 0.01
Political Stability -0.28 0.00 -0.42 -0.20
Government Effectiveness -0.49 -0.09 -0.35 -0.53
Regulatory Quality 0.66 0.90 0.65 -0.11
Source: Kaufmann et al (2003).
(ii) Decentralization and pro-poor growth
Bolivia embarked in 1994–1996 on an ambitious decentralization program, which transferred a 
large share of resources and associated responsibilities to Bolivia’s municipalities.  Municipalities 
were assigned responsibilities for investment expenditures in the social sectors and infrastructure. In 
addition to funds from the central government, they were granted, as an outcome of the National 
Dialogue Law, the entire amount of HIPC II debt relief for investments at the local level (targeted to 
communities with higher rates of unsatisfied basic needs) and they have spent most of these funds, 
as reported above, on social sector investments and most recently also on infrastructure. In addition, 
an intermediate (centrally appointed) layer of government (prefectures) was introduced and also 
given considerable spending and implementation authorities. 
39   Somewhat ironically, the deterioration is least apparent in the political stability measure, given that the 
government was indeed forced out of office by popular protests in 2003.  
42In view of the governance problems cited above, such decentralization could be of help to address 
the problems of lack of transparency and voice as decisions and implementation are brought closer 
to the people affected.  This was also supported by popular oversight mechanisms.  At the same 
time, it is unclear whether such an ambitious decentralization program can tackle the problems of 
low government effectiveness and corruption.  Clearly, it can be only one avenue of governance 
reforms and other items (including judicial reform and improvements in voice and transparency 
throughout the public sector) remain of importance.       
In addition, decentralization in its current form appears to be plagued by a number of problems. 
First, the roles of municipalities versus prefectures are not clarified and lead to cumbersome 
coordination and oversight problems.  Secondly, the institutional capacity of smaller municipalities 
is too weak to undertake many of tasks they are being charged with.  Third, revenue generation at 
the municipal level remained low, with the municipalities depending on average for 80% of their 
resources on the central government (World Bank 2004a). Moreover, they have no control over the 
public sector wage bill for the services under their control (e.g. health and education).  This has 
effectively softened the budget constraint and led in some municipalities to the build-up of 
considerable debt.   The planning and oversight systems are not working well due to weak 
institutional capacity and lead to very slow and cumbersome implementation of investment projects.
It appears that the process of decentralization has proceeded too quickly and overtaxed the capacity 
of the developing municipal authorities.  This has led to capacity constraints, delays in spending, 
complaints of poor and intransparent governance at the municipal level, and left the central 
government with little ability to direct public policy towards priority sectors (World Bank 2004a). 
While many local investment projects which, if successfully executed, were found to have had a 
significant positive impact on health outcomes and water access (Newman et al. 2002), the 
cumbersome procedures, large overheads, and poor capacity have led to very slow implementation. 
The capacity constraints might also explain the focus on social sector spending and infrastructure, at 
the expense of efforts to promote productive sectors.  Programs to promote productive sectors (such 
as credit programs, cluster initiatives, subsidy programs) tend to be much harder to implement than 
the expansion of health and education programs and the construction of physical infrastructure. 
This surely contributed to the considerable improvement in social indicators over the past few 
years, but did little to reduce income poverty.   This focus on social sectors at the expense of 
promoting productive sectors has become one of the main criticisms that have been voiced in the 
current round of the National Dialogue centered on the revision of the PRSP.
As shown above, it has also, at least initially, led to an anti-poor spending pattern on infrastructure. 
As far as the outcome of the decentralization process on poverty is concerned, there is little reliable 
data to date. Viana Sarabia (2004) undertakes an econometric analysis (ordered logit) of the impact 
of three indicators of decentralization on a non-income measure of poverty, the so-called NBI 
(Unmet basic needs). She finds that municipalities with lower levels of unmet basic needs have a 
larger resource envelope per capita to spend, confirming that decentralization did not equate per 
capita spending (or target them to the poorest areas). In addition, the most important determinant of 
the degree of unmet basic needs is the share of own resources spent by a municipality. Given that 
this share is particularly large in richer municipalities, the analysis supports the notion that a 
decentralization process that largely depends on central government transfers for the poorest 
communities will not have a significant impact on poverty outcomes and might in fact exacerbate 
existing inequalities.  More recently, the situation appears to have improved somewhat through the 
better targeting of HIPCII resources to communities and through a greater focus on productive 
sectors (which mainly means infrastructure).  In fact, some poor communities have received much 
more funds and are having difficulties in spending it productively (World Bank 2004a).  
While decentralization might be a way to improve governance and can also enhance pro-poor 
spending, it can generate new problems of capacity constraints, poor fiscal control and oversight, 
and failure to tackle income poverty issues.  If capacity constraints or other institutional weaknesses 
are correlated with income poverty of a municipality, it can even exacerbate existing inequalities 
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keep options open for pro-poor interventions that are directed and supported from the central 
government.   
(iii) PRSP and national dialogue
Bolivia was among the first to complete an Interim PRSP and a full PRSP in 2000 and thus to enjoy 
HIPC debt relief.  The PRSP was the culmination of a systematic National Dialogue Process, which 
was written into a law in 2001 as a permanent institution to take the PRSP process forward. At the 
time, Bolivia’s PRSP has been widely lauded for both its content and process.
But soon after completion of the process, serious disappointment with the process and the outcome 
emerged, and the PRSP began to be considered a ‘dead’ document by most stakeholders (ISS 
2003a, 2003b). Apart from the well-known problems with PRSPs elsewhere (overambitious targets, 
‘laundry lists’ with little prioritization, unclear relation to the government macro and fiscal strategy, 
too focused on trying to please donors in order to get HIPC funds), there appear to have been 
particular problems associated with the National Dialogue and the creation of the PRSP. Among the 
problems encountered in the process, according to an analysis undertaken by the Institute of Social 
Studies, was that the Interim PRSP was never fully discussed, and that there was a significant 
disconnect between the National Dialogue, which was open, transparent, and had significant non-
governmental participation, and the writing of the PSRP that was then relegated to a group of 
consultants who drafted a strategy that was only partly based on the outcomes of the dialogue but 
more influenced by inputs from the donor community and the desire to please the international 
community to get HIPC funds (ISS 2003a, 2003b).  This sharply reduced the popular ownership of 
the final strategy, which in addition became largely obsolete when the macroeconomic conditions 
departed sharply from the rosy projections and plans included in the PRSP. As such, the PRSP had 
little impact beyond the decision in the National Dialogue Law to transfer all HIPC resources to the 
municipalities, which strengthened social sector investments at those levels.
Regarding the content of the strategy, there appears to have been considerable unease over the 
almost exclusive focus on social sector spending as the route out of poverty, the neglect to discuss 
macro issues and consider alternatives to the current economic model guiding Bolivia’s economy, 
the overoptimistic macroeconomic projections, the unsustainable associated expenditure plans, and 
the neglect to focus on strengthening the productive sectors as a means to achieve sustainable 
poverty reduction.  
The revised draft PRSP tabled by UDAPE in late 2003 already included some changes in focus and 
put the development of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises at the heart of the poverty 
reduction strategy. This development was supposed to be promoted through a combination of a land 
policy focusing on titling and increased security of tenure, national productive clusters promoting 
the supply chains for 14 products through joint public-private initiatives (cadenas productivas, see 
Box 4), and through efforts to promote local economic development.   While this focus on 
productive sectors addressed one central complaint about the original PRSP, there continued to be 
disappointment   that   the   revised   strategy   did   not   consider   alternative   economic   models   of 
development, did not include more radical land redistribution programs, and was not far-reaching 
enough in focusing on poverty reduction through strengthening productive sectors (including public 
support for productive sectors that go far beyond the cadenas productivas approach).  As a result, 
this draft is by now also seen as insufficient as the debate has now moved to the constitutional 
assembly where the questions of the use of natural resources, the economic model, and the land 
distribution are likely to figure prominently.
These (necessarily cursory) discussions of institutional issues in policy-making appear to suggest 
the following conclusions for pro-poor policy-making.  First, in a situation of poor and deteriorating 
governance, it is critical to address public sector governance issues as a first priority.   A 
decentralization program can be of help in some aspects, but it is particularly risky to embark on 
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government appeared to have pushed institutional changes to policy-making at a speed that 
eventually weakened its ability to implement effective policies. Second, decentralization need not 
improve governance nor does it necessarily improve the poverty focus of public expenditures. It 
merits consideration whether the central government should consider the build-up of a centrally 
managed approach to promoting equity and assisting with pro-poor growth. In addition, it appears 
that decentralization of the expenditure side without the necessary abilities to raise revenues can 
undermine the success of a decentralization effort. Third, regarding pro-poor policy-making, it is 
very risky and ultimately counter-productive to establish a participatory process of pro-poor policy-
making and then strictly limit the agenda to certain priority actions.  This is particularly risky if 
there is significant mistrust of the government, which is grounded on long-standing inequalities and 
social and political exclusion.  If a process is to be participatory, all aspects of economic policy-
making must be openly discussed even if this can lengthen the process and pose risks for the 
outcome.  The Bolivian case seems to suggest that the route taken here has now led to a very 
polarized political debate that poses even greater risks for political and economic stability than an 
early discussion of all aspects of economic policy-making (see also ISS 2003).
Box 4: 
Cadenas Productivas
The idea was to promote the supply chain through coordinated public and private actions for the following 
14 products: poultry, bananas, cows, Brazil nuts, leather, timber, oil products, palm heart, quinoa, textile 
and cotton, wheat, grapes, (wines and liquors) and tourism (Sucre-Potosi-Uyuni salt lake circuit).  These 
were selected as they already made up a significant share of GDP, generated some 400,000 jobs, were 
often activities undertaken by small farmers or entrepreneurs, and took place in many parts of the country. 
It was intended to strengthen the supply chain by developing  capacities to refine these products within the 
country, and by improving national and particularly international sales opportunities. The plan was to 
generate public-private partnerships that would develop coordinated plans to achieve these goals. Specific 
measures would include technical and technological assistance, support services for production, help with 
market access, and productive infrastructure. The preparation of this strategy would involve three steps 
(strategic vision, strategic plan of coordinated actions, and a conclusion of a public-private pact as part of 
the 2003 National Dialogue). Initial documents set aside public funds from municipal and departmental 
budgets as well as HIPC funds to support these investments. With the shift of the debate to the 
constitutional assembly, the future of this approach to support productive sectors is uncertain.  
Sources: Ministerio de la Presidencia (2003); (UDAPE 2003a).
Chapter 4: Possible Trade-Offs between Growth and Poverty Reduction
Based on the assessments from the CGE model, we can not only assess the impact of individual 
policies on pro-poor growth, but also consider possible trade-offs and complementarities.  When it 
comes to choosing a policy package for pro-poor growth from the available options, it is important 
to know whether particular measures promise to create win-win situations in that they help achieve 
growth and distributional objectives at the same time, or whether there are trade-offs involved. 
In the area of macroeconomic policy, higher yearly devaluations of the Boliviano risk to fail on 
both accounts as a result of adverse balance sheet effects. A tightening of monetary policy, by 
contrast, may bring about the real devaluations that are regularly required to adjust to external 
shocks at a negligible short-run cost for the poor. 
Among the two structural reforms considered here, a deregulation of the urban labor market carries 
the potential to make growth considerably more pro-poor by removing a substantial part of the 
existing wedge between formal and informal wages. Such a measure would, however, meet with 
strong resistance from formal workers, who arguably are much better organized than the diverse 
group of people working in the informal sector. This difficult political situation is probably the key 
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not do enough to reduce rural poverty.  
Similar pressure from powerful interest groups – in this case mainly from public employees – 
stands in the way of a comprehensive tax reform. Provided that this pressure can be overcome, the 
introduction of a revenue-neutral tax reform may improve efficiency and reduce poverty. A pure 
income tax increase, by contrast, is unlikely to serve these objectives. If income taxes are set at 
moderate rates as assumed above, they are likely to be only mildly progressive and may even raise 
poverty. And with substantially higher tax rates, the efficiency losses may well turn out to be 
intolerable.
In the development of Bolivia’s gas sector, there appears to be a trade-off between growth on the 
one hand and the participation of the poor – in particular the rural poor – in the growth process on 
the other hand. Given the prospect that nation-wide poverty might decrease only moderately as a 
result of the resource boom, and that rural poverty might even increase, the rationale behind the 
recent social unrest becomes obvious. The trade-off is, however, hard to avoid as the gas sector is 
highly capital intensive, generates little employment, and uses limited national inputs. To what 
extent growth and poverty objectives can be reconciled depends on how the government allocates 
the additional revenues it receives. While an increase in public savings might cushion the trade-off, 
more specific pro-poor measures are likely to be required in order to make the impact of the gas 
projects socially acceptable. 
Given that rural poverty constitutes the most severe problem, measures targeted at augmenting the 
asset base of smallholders suggest themselves as possible win-win options. It has to be taken into 
account, however, that natural conditions in the highlands are not very favorable, and that the 
growth process would have to start from very low initial capital endowments. This implies that the 
medium-run supply response, and thus the impact on rural poverty, will probably remain limited.
With respect to pro-poor industrial policies, the key question is whether favorable poverty outcomes 
can be achieved at low efficiency losses. Our simulation results indicate that efficiency losses may 
be kept at moderate levels, but that neither a strategy based on export-oriented agriculture nor a 
strategy based on agricultural processing are likely to bring about lasting improvements for the rural 
poor.
Transfer   programs   targeted   towards   the   poor   can   in   principle   alleviate   poverty   without 
compromising growth objectives, but the precondition for this to happen – a more or less complete 
financing of the programs out of other current expenditures – appears to be very demanding. If 
investment spending has to bear the lion’s share of the costs, the economic losses can become 
considerable. 
In the coming years, the gas receipts may provide a way out of this trade-off by loosening the 
budget constraint of the Bolivian government. If gas revenues are used instead of public investment 
funds to finance transfers, the combination of the gas projects and the transfer programs produces a 
clear win-win situation, with higher growth and a marked alleviation of rural and urban poverty. 
The only major drawback of this policy option is that both the gas projects and the transfer 
programs lead to a significant increase in rural inequality, raising the rural Gini coefficient by 
almost three percentage points in the second half of the simulation period.  This is driven by the 
(model) assumption that the transfer programs are targeted in the same way as existing programs.  If 
targeting were to be improved, this rise in inequality could be significantly reduced.  
One way to summarize the trade-off is to examine the combined scenarios in Table 10.  The optimal 
pro-growth scenario combines a gas projects (with constant government consumption) labor market 
and revenue-neutral tax reform.  Growth is boosted to nearly 6% per year.  But the poverty impact 
is only moderate and entirely focused on urban areas; inequality and rural poverty are expected to 
increase.  At the other extreme, we have a pure transfer program which, if coming at the expense of 
public investment reduces growth but also reduces rural and urban poverty, as well as reducing 
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combination of both policy scenarios is likely to be best for sustainable poverty reduction in urban 
and rural areas, with an added focus on improving the targeting of the transfer program.  
While the discussed trade-offs give some impression about the short- to medium-term trade-offs of 
particular policies, such model-based evidence is unable to capture the insights from the large 
literature on the longer-term impact of initial inequality on subsequent growth (summarized in 
Klasen, 2004).  The transmission channels of this literature, such as the impact lower inequality has 
on political and social stability as well as on the ability of the poor to invest in human capital, 
cannot be easily captured in a CGE-model.   Apart from these model-based assessments, it is 
therefore also important to consider more fundamentally the trade-offs involved between a narrow 
growth agenda that is largely guided by policies informed by the Washington Consensus and its 
associated political economy and economic risks. It appears that given Bolivia’s unfavorable initial 
conditions as well as its history of high inequality and large social and ethnic tensions, a 
technocratic focus on liberalization and macro stability might not deliver benefits in terms of 
poverty and inequality reduction quickly enough to prevent serious setbacks as have been 
experienced in Bolivia in recent years.  Also, it will likely do too little to better integrate the poor 
into the growth process.  Going further down that route and hoping that the possible high growth 
associated with natural gas and commercial agriculture exports will deliver enough benefits to 
maintain social stability are likely to prove elusive and might provoke populist backlashes with 
serious consequences for growth and poverty reduction.  Instead it appears necessary to confront the 
issues of deep-seated inequalities in resources, opportunities, and power more directly rather than 
hoping than one can grow out of them.  Some of these questions will be taken up below.
Chapter 5: Recommendations for Policy-Making
Bolivia is now facing a serious economic and political situation.  It is in a state of serious political 
and social unrest, economic conditions are not favorable (although they have stabilized recently), 
and there are loud demands for more spending, more redistribution, and a total abandonment of the 
current economic policy stance. In this situation, it is not easy to come up with a policy framework 
that will successfully steer Bolivia to a path of significant pro-poor growth.  
In this chapter we will start from a combination of incremental policies that all could serve to 
improve the overall slow record of poverty reduction in Bolivia.  We will then move towards asking 
whether a more radical reform of economic policy-making is needed, both in terms of content as 
well as process. We will begin by summarizing some of the conclusions from our model-based 
assessments.
The main general conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing model-based analysis is that in Bolivia 
the opportunities for achieving pro-poor growth differ enormously between urban and rural areas. 
This has been true for the 1990s, where until the outbreak of the recent crisis urban households have 
benefited disproportionately from foreign investment led growth. And it is also true with respect to 
future prospects, which are less favorable for rural households due to several factors.  To support 
our argument, we reorder in Table 12 the main policy experiments from Table 10 according to 
whether the impact is mainly on urban or rural households.  First, the rural economy will inevitably 
have to cope with recurrent disruptions caused by external shocks. Second, difficult natural 
conditions in combination with very low initial capital endowments will limit the impact of efforts 
to increase the asset base of poor farmers. Nonetheless, investments in public goods such as rural 
infrastructure or agricultural research should be taken into consideration as they could at least entail 
some productivity improvements.
40 If it turns out that significant productivity gains can be expected, 
measures aimed at improving smallholders’ access to credit such as increased tenure security or 
additional micro-credit initiatives (including tackling issues of non-traditional forms of guarantees), 
40   Unfortunately, evaluations of the impact of public investments in Bolivia are lacking. Hence, their 
productivity effects can only be guessed, and priority areas for public investment can hardly be identified.
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Also, community-driven investments in irrigation, improved seed varieties, and modern inputs 
should remain firmly on the agenda.
Third, the modern, dynamic segment of the agricultural sector is too small to absorb a sizeable part 
of the poor rural workforce so that a pro-poor industrial policy based on modern agriculture does 
not appear to be promising. Finally, the development of the gas sector will largely bypass the rural 
economy, and will even raise rural poverty via the economy-wide repercussions it entails. As the 
recent protests have shown forcefully, such an uneven distribution of benefits will meet strong 
resistance. This does of course not imply that Bolivia should forego the gains to be expected from 
the gas exports, but rather that rural households should be able to share in the gains to an extent that 
more than compensates the expected losses to them. To achieve this, direct transfers constitute the 
only realistic option as only direct transfers can raise incomes significantly in the short to medium 
run. Such transfers should, however, be targeted very carefully. By simply expanding existing 
transfer programs, as assumed in the simulation reported above, the government will miss most of 
the poorest households. As a further caveat, the financing of transfers that are large enough to 
accomplish a significant poverty reduction is only sustainable as long as the gas boom endures. All 
in all, given current constraints, it is thus likely that the prospects of fostering rural development 
will to a large extent rely on dynamic growth of the urban economy, which would indirectly raise 
rural incomes via increased rural-urban migration, higher intermediate demand for agricultural raw 
materials, and higher consumption demand for food.  In this context, the dynamic development, in 
terms of population growth, economic growth, and poverty reduction, of small and medium-sized 
towns in Bolivia could provide one avenue for providing employment and income-earning 
opportunities for the rural poor.  Supporting such growth centers through infrastructure investments 
and support for decentralized industrial activities might be one option to consider.  







Main Effect on Rural Households
El Niño -0.3 1.3 0.8
Terms-of-Trade Shock 0.0 0.5 0.2
Investment in Rural Infrastructure 0.1 -0.4 -0.3
Improved Access to Credit for 
Smallholders
0.0 0.0 -0.1
Industrial Policy (modern agriculture) 0.0 -0.1 0.7
Transfer Program 0.0 -2.3 -1.0
Main Effect on Urban Households
Gas Projects 0.6 1.0 -2.8
Labor Market Reform 0.3 0.0 -1.5
Tax Reform 0.3 -0.4 -1.9
Gas Projects + Labor 1.1 0.2 -5.4
Market Reform + Tax Reform
Declining Capital Inflows -0.3 0.5 1.4
aPercentage points deviation from base run.
Source: Based on Table 10.
Several options can be pursued to raise urban growth and to alleviate urban poverty. Despite limited 
linkages to the rest of the economy, the development of the gas sector will benefit urban areas. The 
positive effect will be the stronger the more the gas projects boost domestic investment. Beside the 
funds earmarked for pro-poor spending, a substantial part of the gas revenues should thus be used to 
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keep public consumption under control. 
In addition, the two big remaining structural reforms, a deregulation of the urban labor market and 
an income tax reform, would both have a significantly positive impact on growth and poverty and 
should thus be initiated. The main problem with these reforms is that the potential losers – non-
agricultural workers and employees, respectively – can effectively lobby against them. Perhaps it 
will become somewhat easier to overcome their resistance if the structural reforms are carried out in 
combination with the gas projects as all urban household groups stand to benefit from the latter.  If 
this were further combined with transfer programs aimed at the rural poor, it might be possible to 
generate a politically and economically feasible policy package for pro-poor growth.  
Beyond the model-based simulations, there are further policy options to consider.  As mentioned 
above, there is great need to switch to a tax regime that is more progressive than the current system 
and could also go beyond the revenue neutral system that is proposed in the model. On the 
expenditure   side,   there   is   considerable   scope   for   increasing   the   poverty   focus   of   public 
expenditures. In health and education sectors, this can be achieved by requiring larger co-payments 
from the better-off and ensuring better access and utilization of higher education and higher order 
health facilities for the poor. In order to free up resources, reforms of the pension system must 
proceed in a way that limits government spending on this program that has little poverty impact. 
Expenditure   reform   should   also   include   a   greater   poverty   focus   of   decentralized   public 
expenditures. This can either be ensured through greater equity in inter-governmental transfers, with 
a particular emphasis on increasing the resource envelope of poorer municipalities (using formulas 
that are not only based on population), or through additional central government programs in these 
areas.
In line with the demands made from many sides, it is important to overcome the disconnect between 
social sector performance and economic performance.  While the social sector improvements are 
impressive and need to be sustained as important achievements in their own right, their impact on 
income poverty will largely materialize in the longer term and will require complementary 
measures to support the productive sectors.  Consequently, public expenditures should not only 
focus on social sectors (important as they are for reaching the MDGs), but include rising 
expenditures for measures to strengthen production among the poor. The planned efforts to 
strengthen the  cadenas productivas  appear to be a step in the right direction. In addition, 
municipalities should be encouraged to experiment with various ways of strengthening their 
productive sectors through infrastructure, credit, and subsidy programs. This is particularly 
important as neither the national nor the international experience suggest clear best-practice models. 
Based   on   evaluations   of   successes   and   failures,   better-managed   programs   should   then   be 
mainstreamed across the country.
 Success on such ventures will greatly depend on the ability to overcome institutional weaknesses 
within the public sector.  In particular, control of corruption and low government effectiveness 
should be the primary focus of public sector reform efforts.   This will require greater transparency 
and voice in all tiers of government.  Decentralization can support such a process but only if the 
current defects of the process are fixed.   They include unclear roles for municipalities versus 
prefectures, capacity constraints in the poorer and smaller municipalities, too little central oversight 
and fiscal control, too little ability to affect pro-poor spending and implementation at the local level. 
But the analysis has also shown that there are a range of basic constraints that need to be addressed 
if Bolivia is to succeed in developing and implementing a pro-poor growth agenda.  A first critical 
constraint is the low domestic savings rate which leads to dependence on foreign capital, leads to 
foreign debt, and contributes to the vulnerability of the economy to external shocks against which it 
cannot act due to the high degree of dollarization.  Here a combination of policy measures ought to 
be considered.  First, at the international level the question should be re-opened whether debt relief 
in the case of Bolivia was deep enough.  After several years of low growth, the foreign debt burden 
49is high, putting pressure on the fiscal side and sharply curtailing any room for devaluations to 
improve the competitiveness of Bolivia’s economy.  Second, measures to raise the domestic savings 
should be strengthened.  They should include both institutional strengthening of the financial sector, 
particularly the availability of reliable savings institutions also in small towns and rural areas, 
policies to shield savings from the risks of inflation (through index-linked products and possibly a 
complete indexation of the economy), and policies to promote public savings (through limiting 
obligations on the pension system, savings proceeds from the gas project, and further debt relief or 
an increasing share of grant aid).  Third, measures to reduce dollarization should be pursued more 
vigorously to increase the ability of the monetary authorities to engage in pro-poor monetary 
policies.   Given the by now long record of low inflation, it should be in the interest of the 
government to begin pushing back the dollarization of its economy. This could be done via a set of 
incentives   such   as   the   recently   passed   financial   transactions   tax   which   is   only  levied   on 
$-denominated transactions, differential reserve requirements for $ versus Boliviano denominated 
assets, and a push to popularize inflation-indexed securities as the main form of issuing government 
debt. Once dollarization has been reduced, a much more active management of the exchange rate 
would become possible to ensure international competitiveness and also address distributional 
issues. To maintain this flexibility, controls on capital inflows might be needed to ensure that they 
do not destabilize the currency and financial markets.  Should natural gas exports increase to the 
level envisaged, management of the exchange rate through sterilization policies would be critical to 
limit Dutch disease effects.
Secondly, it appears urgently necessary to confront some of the more deep-seated inequalities in 
Bolivia’s economy. As part of the on-going discussions in the National Dialogue as well as in the 
Constitutional Assembly, a national plan for the redistribution of assets should be considered. 
Elements of such a plan could include greater attention to land redistribution (in addition to titling) 
from public lands, market and subsidy-based land reforms using land taxes to increase the land 
brought to the market. In addition, such a strategy could include a mechanism that would transfer 
part of the benefits from natural resources directly to the poor to ensure their direct access to the 
proceeds from these assets.  The use of demand-side transfers such as those pioneered in Mexico 
(Progresa and Oportunidad) or Brazil (bolsa escolar) might be a good way to proceed.  Third, it 
appears that much of Bolivia’s current social and political turmoil stems from the fact that its 
indigenous population was largely excluded from the political process.  Measures to increase their 
voice and power through quotas and other mechanisms might be considered to involve them more 
directly in policy-making.
Given Bolivia’s history and its current problems, achieving sustained high rates of pro-poor growth 
will be very difficult unless these deep-seated inequalities are addressed.
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